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West Europe Report

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PAPER PUZZLED AT JORGENSEN'S PRAISE FOR NORWAY'S SECURITY DEBATE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 May 84 p 14

[Editorial: "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone"]

[Text] Last Thursday the Storting reached a broad agreement on Norway's security policy. With his well-developed sense for picking up the words and signals that he wants to pick up, and converting them to a reality which he himself creates, Anker Jorgensen understood the agreement as an expression that Norway now--by a broad parliamentary majority--is supporting an active Nordic policy in which the absolute goal will be the Nordic countries as a nuclear weapon-free zone.

The issue, however, is not so simple. The Norwegian Storting had its missile debate in the fall of 1983, and lines of division were present in the Storting corresponding to those seen in the Danish Folketing all too often during the past 15 months. Despite these lines of division, however, the Storting preserved the ability to conduct broad discussions about Norwegian security policy and disarmament questions. For a long time in the Storting Foreign Affairs Committee there has been work on security and disarmament questions, and the government was able, in agreement with the Labor Party, to present a proposition which the Storting majority could agree to. It was especially remarkable that the government spokesmen praised the parliamentary leader of the Labor Party, Gro Harlem Brundtland, for her work on the committee. It was their impression that she had a special desire to do her best to restore broad agreement around the cornerstones of Norwegian foreign policy. She did not contradict them.

Unity requires that Norway be dependent on binding Western cooperation in order to take care of the country's security requirements, that Norway have a clear need for the security guarantee which NATO and the United States provide, and that the security depends on keeping the supply lines from the west open, and on depots in Norway for the heavy NATO material. In this way Norway has confirmed that Norwegian defense is an integrated link in NATO defenses, and is included in NATO's defense strategy. Is it this unity that Anker Jorgensen has become so enthusiastic about?

The Storting also voted on a proposal for a resolution which read, "Nuclear weapons will not be used in the defense of Norway." The proposal was defeated, with 139 members voting against and 15 voting in favor. Was it that vote that Anker Jorgensen became so enthusiastic about?

In addition the Storting rejected the idea that in any way or at any time there could be any talk of a unilateral and separate nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area. The idea of a nuclear weapon-free zone exists as a remote negotiating goal, as a link in international disarmament negotiations, and thereby as a part of the grand political game of how to create a more peaceful world. If it is this concept of the idea of a nuclear weapon-free zone which Anker Jorgensen has become enthusiastic about, then there is perhaps the possibility that Denmark can also look forward to a more fruitful political debate.

But I wonder if he learned enough about the fundamentals before he grasped at some words from the Norwegian debate?

9287
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THIRD WORLD SAID CAPABLE OF PRODUCING CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 13 Apr 84 p 12

[Article by Franco Prattico: "A Talk with Professor Malizia, Toxicologist of the University of Rome--Even a Third-World Nation Can Produce Fearsome Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] Rome--"The problem is an old one. It goes back at least to 1932, when the convention banning chemical weapons was finally approved at Geneva; but in reality, all the industrial countries have continued to produce substances that can be used for chemical warfare--as is demonstrated, for that matter, by the recent events in the Iraq-Iran war." This is stated by Prof Enrico Malizia, professor of clinical toxicology in the University of Rome and director of the Antipoison Center of the capital's Policlinico hospital.

Even a summary review of the various types of product that can be used in an "antiperson" function is chilling. "The gases," says Malizia, "can be of various types, depending on the substances from which they are extracted or the type of lesions that they cause. Generally speaking, we subdivide them into three categories: organic-action gases (suffocants, such as phosgene or chlorine, or vesicants such as dichloroethyl sulphide, the famous mustard gas); irritants, such as the tear gases that police forces have, which do not have high toxic action; and finally, the general-action gases--those that penetrate into the organism and cause damage to vital organs or to enzymatic systems necessary for life: an example is hydrocyanic acid, which the Iraqis are probably using, at least to judge from the news reports."

During World War II, the Germans developed (but did not use) organophosphate-base products which, Professor Malizia explains, inhibit the cholinesterase enzyme: if the action of that enzyme is blocked, the organism is paralyzed, and death comes after a short time. The only antidote known is atropine.

"But our review does not end here," Professor Malizia continues. "There are products normally available in the market, such as antiparasitic substances or defoliants, that in reality can be used as toxic gases. This is the case with 'Paraquat,' a chlorophenol whose action is very similar to that of

dioxine and that is extremely toxic upon contact with man. There are numerous cases of fatal poisoning by Paraquat, which is still being produced both in France and in England by Imperial Chemical Industries, and in the United States by Dow Chemical. Paraquat causes irreversible damage to the lungs, and serious renal and cerebral lesions. It is yellow; and it is curious," Malizia notes, "that yellow is the color of almost all these deadly products."

But there are those (the French journal LE MONDE, for example) who maintain that the substances used by the Iraqis against Khomeini's soldiers are of still another type: a blend of the "old" mustard gas, which causes often fatal burns and lesions of the skin and lungs, and an organic product, the mycotoxins.

"As their name says," Malizia replies, "the mycotoxins are substances obtained from cultivation of fungi by fermentation. A mycotoxin is what is produced by the famous LSD [as published], lysergic acid, from a fungus called *claviceps purpurea*: it has a generally irreversible action on the nervous system, and it can be defined as a psychic toxin. Another fungus from which a mycotoxin is extracted is *Tricotecene*, another product of yellow color. It causes irreversible damage to vital organs, blocks respiration, and causes death rapidly if sufficient doses of it come into contact with the organism."

The combined action of mustard gas and mycotoxins--if they are what the fearsome cocktail used by the Iraqis really consists of--is frightening, because it adds two different effects together. One is of a more superficial character, at the level of the skin and the orifices, like mustard gas: "It has a latency period of 3 or 6 hours," Malizia says, "and meanwhile the product settles in the skin and in the lungs. Then the first symptoms begin to appear: blisters on the skin, lesions to the eyes, sores in the respiratory apparatus. While the subject is being paralyzed by the mustard gas, the mycotoxins begin their lethal work in the organism, at the level of the enzymatic systems and the internal organs, or by working on the central and peripheral nervous systems. The poison acts with particular effectiveness because it 'attacks' the same organism in two different directions."

It is not difficult to produce toxic gases; nor is a big industrial apparatus required for setting up a plant for nerve or poison gases: it is sufficient to have a chemical establishment capable of carrying out operations of no great complexity and sufficiently isolated from the external environment, and to obtain a supply of raw materials, which almost any big chemical industry in the world can supply.

Even a Third-World country, therefore, is capable today of producing hemotoxic gases--gases capable of blocking cellular respiration--or neurotoxic agents (such as the mycotoxins or the organophosphates) that impede transmission of nerve impulses, causing paralysis of the organism. The victim loses control of his general muscular activity, begins to slobber, vomits. Death comes almost always by asphyxiation, because the respiratory muscles have become inert. The effectiveness of these neurotoxic agents is frightening: a microscopic drop is enough to kill a man.

Banning the production of these substances is especially difficult from a practical point of view. In contrast to nuclear plants, the plants for them do not require large apparatuses, do not emit radiation, and can be masked by any "peaceful" chemical activity. This is precisely what makes them particularly insidious: especially if the capacity for producing them is in the hands of people devoid of political or human scruples. Or desperate people.

11267

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PARLIAMENT PASSES TOUGHER SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Jun 84 p 12

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard: "Bill Approved: Policy Intensified Toward South Africa"]

[Text] Voting against the government, a majority consisting of the Social Democrats, SF [Socialist People's Party], Radicals and VS [Left-Socialist Party] approved a resolution which originated in SF sharpening the policy of sanctions toward South Africa. In the resolution the government is ordered once a year to make a satisfactory survey of the size of coal imports from South Africa by the companies involved. Furthermore the government must affirm to oil companies and Danish shipowners that it is in conflict with Danish trade and foreign policies to conduct trade with oil and/or transport of oil to South Africa. During the first 6 months of 1985 the government must investigate the extent of oil transport and oil sale to South Africa between 1979 and 1983. At the meeting of Nordic foreign ministers the government is required actively to work to distance itself from any Nordic participation in IMF loans to South Africa. The government is required--if necessary by law--to stop every form of new Danish investment in South Africa.

9287

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LEADER IN TRUNCATED PROGRESSIVE PARTY VOWS REVIVAL

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Jun 84 p 7

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard: "Helge Dohrmann Expects New Voters to Stream In"]

[Text] The Progressive Party is at the cutoff point of two percent according to the latest voter analysis, but the party's group chairman Helge Dohrmann believes that new voters will stream in to the Progressive Party during the summer and fall, because the government is gradually "conducting a policy which resembles Anker Jorgensen's."

The voter analysis was conducted by the Vilstrup Institute and published in POLITIKEN. It shows that the Progressive Party gets two percent of the votes compared with three and six-tenths percent in the election in January. That gave the party six seats in the Folketing, but today the party has only five after the formation of the Free Democrats.

Helge Dohrmann told BERLINGSKE that he does not especially believe in the results of the analysis.

"But it is naturally true that the internal unrest which we have experienced has damaged the party enormously.

"I simply believe that during the summer and fall entirely new voting figures will appear, because the government is not conducting the same policy as in the beginning.

"The government's policy will soon resemble Anker Jorgensen's, and that circumstance means that the Progressive Party will get new voters.

"I have noticed that many of the voters who said openly at the last election that they voted for the Conservative Party are no longer satisfied, so we will get them back.

"So I am full of confidence."

On Sunday BERLINGSKE's Gallup poll, which was taken in May, will be published.

In the April Gallup poll, published in BERLINGSKE on 6 May, the Progressive Party received two and six-tenths percent of the vote.

BRIEFS

COMMUNIST PARTY QUALIFIES FOR ELECTION--Denmark's Communist Party [DKP] has now collected 25,000 signatures which makes the party qualified to nominate for the next Folketing election. The signatures will be delivered to the Ministry of Interior today at 0930, said party chairman Jorgen Jensen at a press conference yesterday at Christiansborg. At the moment DKP has about 10,000 members who are active in the peace movements and in the "struggle against the nonsocialist government." At the press conference it was also reported that the party will hold its national congress on 15-16 September, presumably in Aalborg. [By Klauz] [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 May 84 p 10] 9287

CSO: 3613/171

SPD PROSPECTS DIMMED BY LEADERSHIP GAPS, VAGUE POLICIES

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 18 May 84 p 3

[Article by Walter Bajohr: "The Social Democrats Are Setting the Directions for the Future of the Party. Leftist Suspension Party Without a Real Drawing Card. The New Orientation of the SPD Is Not Going the Way Its Advocates Had Imagined"]

[Text] The Essen Party Congress is supposed to introduce the renewal of the Godesberg Program. However, in order to become capable again of winning a majority, the party first of all needs convincing politicians.

Now the pictures differ: Just half a year has passed since the SPD commanded the headlines for weeks with a party congress. The party's "No" to the NATO counterarmament, decided in November 1983 in Cologne, is almost forgotten. In those days the directions for the political future of the SPD were set. But this having been done, the party still did not follow a clearly definable orientation. Now the SPD is again holding a party congress at which the future course of the party is being discussed. But the attention which this event received along the perimeter was as insignificant as rarely in the case of this party.

Is this a sign of normalcy that has taken place or plainly non-observance because of presumed insignificance? Probably a mixture of both. After the highly emotionalized debate on the counterarmament, which moreover was garnished with the name of Helmut Schmidt, comforting normalcy has indeed returned to the way of thinking of the SPD. This is also noticeable in the party. After one and a half years of opposition without realistic prospect of soon being able to return to the levers of power in Bonn, the SPD is fully occupied with clearing operations. It is hoped that it will be possible to recognize once again clear goals and clearly marked paths to these goals, once the rubbish has been removed, which had accumulated during the long period of government, which at the end became increasingly more frustrating for the inner life of the SPD.

The new orientation of the SPD--it did not begin just with the missile discussion, but in the meantime it is not going as well as could be expected as recently as a half a year ago. Those who had believed that, with the change into the opposition, the SPD would break out on all fronts and swarm out into the

green Utopia today face the astonishing fact that the party is probing the terrain much more soberly and cautiously than could have been assumed in the course of the religious battle over Pershing and cruise missiles.

Not even as parliamentary opposition does the the SPD fulfill the cliché that one creates for himself of a parliamentary group which has gotten rid of the fetters of government responsibility. Perhaps here the Greens exert a disciplining effect. The comrades do not want to let themselves go in order not to be identified too closely with the nays of the ecological front. But this is half of the explanation at most.

In what situation is the SPD today? To begin with, it has had to renounce all illusions that the new government coalition would offer such a contrasting program to the policies of the former SPD/FDP coalition that for this reason alone to engage in opposition politics would be a profitable task and one which would never be at a loss for topics. Instead, the new alliance--with the exception of the usual, even if (keyword amnesty) rarely unavoidable mistakes--up to now functioned to the satisfaction of the citizens. The opinion surveys prove it week after week.

Even the favorite toy of the Social Democrats, the policy of inner-German relations, is being treated so carefully by the Bonn coalition that the comrades clearly have run out of ideas on the subject. And the fact that, of all people, Fritz Zimmermann, the minister of the interior selected by the opposition as the target, is pursuing a course in environmental policy which--even if not always very effective--is nevertheless strict and effective in the public, has taken the Social Democrats by surprise. In economic policy they had to give in a long time ago--the main reason why the SPD lost the power to govern. The discussion of security policy, on the other hand, moves in trajectories which are much too complicated for the mass of the population and consequently hold little attraction. In short: In nearly all spheres the SPD has lost the opinion leadership.

This is no merely apparent development, which would be readily revisable through increased efforts. Rather it is a dualism in the political consciousness of the German citizens which become noticeable here. Reduced to a short denominator: In times in which there are crises everywhere, the majority of voters prefers to trust the political forces which approach problems pragmatically. People, at the very least, want to see security for that which still exists, and not--in favor of uncertain models of the future--gamble away what exists as well. Only when people in general believe to be in a state of security, in terms of domestic and foreign policy, economically as well as socially, the dispositions become free which face changes in an open-minded manner.

Two possibilities result from this for the SPD. On the one hand, it can try to surpass the governing coalition in terms of pragmatism in order thus to make itself attractive as the alternative in the quickest possible way. On the other hand, it has the possibility of very calmly undertaking a new orientation and to wait until the Christian-Liberals mismanage. That this path is the only realistic one results not only from the fact that the SPD has already embarked on it. The other option is precluded for them rather from the outset

for two reasons: First of all, a pragmatic, that is to say necessarily "rightist" policy could not be maintained against the sooner leftist majority situation in the SPD. Secondly, it would not be sufficient to embark upon this path on paper, but it would necessarily require a convincing personification.

But where in the SPD are the figures who could convey to a media-dependent public the impression of greater competence than the present government team. Here is the real reason why the opposition existence of the SPD is likely to be of some duration.

The dilemma shows itself in an exemplary manner in the field of economic policy. The leading proposal of the party executive committee to the party congress speaks more about market and competition than once could expect in the case of a state-oriented SPD. Yet far and wide there is no one in sight who could represent the programmatic position to the outside in a credible manner. To be sure, in the Bundestag parliamentary group Wolfgang Roth is a competent expert, but without any external effect. Herbert Ehrenberg, who was responsible for the elaboration of the economic policy statements, likewise by far does not have the format of a new Schiller. But it was precisely because of this loss of credibility that the SPD lost crucial battalions of voters to the Union.

Party chief Willy Brandt, too, after the tireless "ceterum censeo" of his federal manager Peter Glotz, has set aside the search for the new majority left of the Union as the top priority and has executed a turn after the turn. "The German Left will only then be capable of winning a majority," he indicated to the functionaries of his party, "if it also wins over voters who have up to now cast their ballot for the Union, in particular technicians and engineers, people in management and thoughtful entrepreneurs." His advocacy of an open SPD is devoid of leftist partiality: "We want votes from both sides."

But how to bring it about? As long as the SPD does not yet have clear statements concerning the decisive problem areas of German politics, it can scarcely make up for the migration losses. And to place one's hope only on the band of people disappointed by the governing coalition is at most a strategy of embarrassment. But the SPD could be forced to pursue precisely this strategy because, with an eye to the next Bundestag election, the process of a new orientation can hardly be completed.

It is only now that the SPD is painfully beginning to realize that new technologies do not necessarily have to be of the devil's making, but probably represent the only chance to maintain national prosperity. Peter Glotz, who throws himself into battle with the stormy intelligence peculiar to him, in order to make it clear to his comrades that one can influence developments that are irresistible only if one jumps on the train already in motion, expects not only good things from the Essen Party Congress. He knows the unholy alliance of bewildered and for that reason obstinate trade union members in the party with the green comrades opposed to progress, who, while not capable of preventing the Yes of the SPD with respect to technological change, can make it more

Now as before, security policy, too, contains inflammable matter. Although Cologne has been unhooked, the left in the SPD perceives in the lead proposal of the party executive committed a step backward. It is regarded as simply a catastrophe, above all because, of all things, it begins with a clear avowal of NATO. Moreover, people claim to have recognized that the renunciation of nuclear deterrence could be purchased with an acknowledgment of conventional armament. Together with the proposals in regard to economic policy and new technologies, the party left sees here the door for the opening of the SPD to the left closed again.

The unconcealed by rightist comrades about a Grand Coalition fits into this. Not only the most influential trade unionist in the SPD, the boss of the Chemical Industry Workers Union, Hermann Rappe, is thinking aloud about the chances of an alliance between the giants. Many already perceive the elections to the House of Deputies in Berlin during next spring as a pilot run if--which is very probable--neither the SPD nor the CDU can govern alone. The deeper sense of such deliberations lies not only in the apprehension that otherwise the political challenges of the coming years cannot be endured. There are also intra-party reasons for playing with the idea of a Grand Coalition.

Not by accident do the influential comrades belonging to the right wing of the SPD fear that, in spite of all well-intended resolutions passed at party congresses, the development of the SPD in the direction of the left periphery of the political spectrum is in the long run irresistible. After all, the members of the coming generation in the party almost without exception are embarked on the political paths of the Greens and the peace movement. However, if--and the rightists do not have any doubts about this--in the course of the next few years they also moved programmatically along a broad front, they can no longer count on regaining the hereditary potential of voters. Should, however, a grand coalition come into being, there would be the chance, by virtue of new government responsibility, of regaining the opinion leadership in some areas as well, and thus the old voters. People are willing to pay the price for the return to the left wing. If, in return, the SPD again moves into the mainstream of politics.

While Willy Brandt is not open-minded with respect to such considerations, he is also not completely deaf. He faces the unpleasant situation not to be able to present a convincing leadership team to his party. His deputy, Helmut Schmidt, who now is also formally leaving the party stage, is being replaced by Joenen Vogel. But no one believes that the leader of the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag is more than a temporary solution. He discharges his office in the parliamentary group as a party soldier conscious of his duty is capable of doing. Honestly, but without any prospects. Carrier of the hopes for the SPD he cannot be. While Johannes Rau is regarded as the designated successor of the party chief, he, too, cannot be a candidate for chancellor. The "thin" guard of the rising generation stands sooner to the left, in short no more for majority-providing candidates. This personnel situation, too, makes the toying with the grand coalition interesting for many--especially when they do not believe in regeneration in the opposition lasting 15 years, as Herbert Wehner has gloomily predicted.

8970

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COMMUNIST PARTY SEEN ENTERING NEW ERA AFTER CHANGES AT CONGRESS

Stalinist Wing Organ Evaluates

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 29 May 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Toward Action to Save the SKP"]

[Text] Actually a small party minority, the SKP's [Finnish Communist Party] conservative hard line, has gotten the SKP into the worst lowpoint in its history. It terrorized the 20th party congress and seized control of the party leadership.

The hard line turned its back on the will of the overwhelming majority of the party members and on the hopes of party friends and affiliated parties.

All appeals to it to abandon its dictatorial resolutions, for discussion and for unity fell on deaf ears.

The hard line drafted its forced resolution consistently, longwindedly and with absolutely no regard for others. Explanations to the effect that the forces of unity had allegedly forced the hard line to make a dictatorial decision can be judged on their own merit.

The hard line set itself the unconditional objective of choosing Arvo Aalto to be chairman in full cognizance of the fact that he does not have the backing of the great majority of the members and that neither a united party congress nor party unity can be developed around him. Thus Aalto and his backers knowingly chose a collision course and in that way secured a pretext to completely seize control of the party leadership and engage in future "reform measures."

It is not a matter of Aalto's person as such, but of the ideological-political line that is personified in him, one with which we have had enough experience. In his final statement during the party congress debate, ousted chairman Jouko Kajanoja felt that it was quite true that "real ideological-political policy choices" were behind the forced resolution.

Although under the threat of dividing the party, the factional victory and choice of Aalto were regarded as being unavoidable so that we could assume "Eurocommunist" distance from the international communist movement and the

CPSU, open the door to a change in the nature of the party and to exchanging the main policy line, which is opposed to monopolies, for a historic compromise line, and get caught up in the wake of the government's conservative policy. The course the party congress followed also offered clear indications of these aspirations, although for tactical reasons and under pressure the conservative faction was in part disguised, since in this situation they felt that the main issue was to seize control of the leadership.

The refer to the new Aalto rump leadership as being "capable of getting things done." This "ability to get things done" is the power to close down the party paper, YHTEISTYÖ, channel forces toward the party's internal struggle, separate and divide. They proclaim that they are now going to put an end to the "mess," but hard line actions represent the mess at its worst. They claim that by seizing the leadership for the hard line the "ability to cooperate has been restored." In reality they have broken off relations with the majority of the party rank and file and with many friends and the orientation they have adopted is designed to isolate the party internationally and nationally as well, even though in his hurry to get into the government Aalto imagines things to be otherwise.

For these and many other reasons the hard line's victory is a Pyrrhic victory, an impermanent period of transition in the life of the SKP that is doomed to collapse. The members and friends of the SKP, our country's working class and its allies, do not need a historic compromise party, a faceless coattail party, but a united, fighting Marxist-Leninist party. The SKP must be kept as this kind of a party.

Without regard for all the artificial factional lines of the forces that support SKP principles and unity, we must now act to save the party in such a way that this action is firmly linked with political struggles. The demand for a special congress that would repair the damage that has been done is the right thing. We can and ought to do a lot of other things too. We must not now lose heart, resign ourselves or allow ourselves to be intimidated. It is a time for rallying, firm mutual solidarity among constructive forces and decisive action.

Stalinist Paper Outlines Course

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 30 May 84 p 2

[Editorial: "About the Tasks"]

[Text] The failure of the 20th SKP Congress and the ruin that is threatening the party impose urgent tasks on the Communists and also on the party's friends.

First, we must ourselves determine what happened at the congress and what we can expect from the conservative rump leadership. This information must be transmitted as widely as possible.

Second, we must quickly organize party organization meetings at which the situation is discussed, approve the demand for the convocation of a special, unifying congress and decide on the practical steps to be taken, among others, steps

involving action for the circulation and support of TIEDONANTAJA. The special district meetings of the eight SKP district organizations to be held at the end of the week will point the way for us.

Third, we must foster and develop contacts, cooperation and solidarity among all those forces promoting the best interests of the SKP. We must get ready to come up with a response to divisive and oppressive actions.

Fourth, despite what happened in June, we must energetically go on with our political campaigns, like peace and solidarity activities, pressure to combat fines for striking and the dilution of unemployment safeguards and support for workshop workers.

Parallel District Organization Weighed

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Jun 84 p 8

[Text] SKP moderate leaders are contemplating the establishment of a parallel organization to compete with the SKP Uusimaa district organization which is in the hands of rigid-line Stalinists.

The eight SKP Stalinist districts met at the end of last week at a special district meeting and decided to begin preparations for getting together the special party congress.

Led by Markus Kainulainen, the Uusimaa district organization, which proposed the establishment of a national Communist committee to organize activities, adopted the toughest line against the party leadership, which is fully controlled by the moderates. Widespread national action was also contemplated in the Joensuu district.

According to SKP first secretary Aarno Aitamurto, the Uusimaa district proposal "cannot be ignored in silence." The moderates are still sifting the results of the Stalinist district meetings.

The Stalinists have decided on a common line of action for the immediate future and we do not as yet know whether the Uusimaa district proposal will be favorably received in the other districts. In 1969 the Stalinists set up the same sort of committee when they marched out of the 15th party congress.

The Uusimaa district has proposed that representatives from the nine moderate district area also be appointed to the committee in addition to the Stalinist district representatives. The fact that there are Stalinist district internal tensions tells us that Uusimaa would like to have the right for the district to appoint its own representative on the committee. The district has also demanded that the line pursued by the Stalinist mouthpiece, TIEDONANTAJA, be sharpened.

Aalto, Aitamurto Comment

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 3 Jun 84 p 23

[Articles by Juhani Aromaki and Kyosti Karvonen: "Aalto and Aitamurto's Daily Grind Begins"]

[Aromaki]

[Text] The traces of the chaos in the SKP could not yet be seen in Communist headquarters on the fifth floor of Helsinki's Culture House.

Ousted SKP chairman Jouko Kajanoja's name was still on the door of his office, but the office was, to be sure, empty and silent.

The new chairman, 52-year-old Arvo Aalto, was in his old office. Surrounding the former first secretary were red roses and many sorts of souvenirs. Lapland comrades had sent a picture carved out of the side of a dead pine in which two reindeer drivers push forward to an unfathomable goal.

The 20th SKP Congress did not go according to the moderates' plan. Nor did it go as the Stalinists had hoped it would either.

"The obvious objective of the party's nine moderate district organizations was to obtain strong representation in the party leadership. It was also obvious that eight individuals who have the confidence of the so-called Stalinist districts could be included among the central party administration leaders in pretty much the same way as on the previous Central Committee," Arvo Aalto said.

"First, the Stalinists tried to dictate to the moderates whom the moderates would be permitted to choose as chairman. Then the Stalinists aimed at getting moderates other than those attending the congress on the Central Committee. When they did not achieve these objectives, they refused to go along with anything. And then the representatives of the nine moderate districts said that that was all right with them."

In Arvo Aalto's opinion, it cannot be appropriate for the congress minority to be able to dictate its will to the majority in any culture that holds congresses.

"Reality must be accepted as it is in a given environment."

Arvo Aalto got involved in a frantic whirl on the eve of the party congress. The Stalinists wanted to have anyone else but Arvo Aalto as chairman. The Soviet newspapers "demonstrated their solidarity" with Jouko Kajanoja.

A Communist veteran at the congress said that he was distressed because "CPSU comrades had to publicly assume the disagreeable role of go-between."

Arvo Aalto now speaks very grudgingly of the Soviet Union and of sending observers to the CPSU congress.

"The situation Finnish comrades created for the Soviets was not at least in all respects in keeping with the Soviets' real hopes, nor were they pleased with it," Arvo Aalto thought.

Stalinist head man Taisto Sinisalo indeed doubted that Aalto's election would strain state relations and completely suspend relations between the SKP and the CPSU.

The SKP congress strengthened the SKP's traditional attitude toward the CPSU and, in Arvo Aalto's opinion, no one can change unambiguous decisions into something else.

"I said at the congress too that the election of party leaders is our own business. If the delegates who attend the party congress with the authorization of the members of our party are incapable of choosing key leaders for them, no one is capable of doing it better on their behalf," Arvo Aalto said.

"It is important for the leaders of the two parties to have open and trusting relations. However, leaders come and go and interparty relations are always more important than personal relations.

"SKP attitudes toward the CPSU or the Soviet Union have not changed. If anything creates difficulties in the handling of normal party relations, I will make a decisive effort to put an end to the 'stumbling block' as quickly as possible," Arvo Aalto said.

First Secretary's Historic Compromise

The Stalinists in many ways regard Arvo Aalto as being a dangerous man and a serious obstacle to their own aspirations. For the second time they reminded us of the so-called historic compromise that Aalto proposed about 5 years ago.

"I still subscribe to the basic idea," Arvo Aalto said.

The then labor minister and SKP first secretary's compromise was among other things interpreted "as a sort of political platform or major political solution by means of which the interests and aspirations of the working class and the nation's middle class would in one way or another be united and which would also be achieved through the efforts of these classes."

According to Arvo Aalto, even at the time of the proposal it was evident that the Left-Center government coalition had reached an impasse. He regards his speech as a cry of alarm to save the coalition.

"Actual experience has demonstrated that my judgment was right.

"After World War II the key Finnish bourgeois, J.K. Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen, exhibited wisdom in their foreign policy, which rose from narrow bourgeois class interests to the detached level of the nation's interest. They considered affairs in terms of a more remote future.

"If the same line of thinking existed among Finland's bourgeoisie in our domestic and economic affairs, quite different kinds of possibilities for resolving the major issues that from year to year are still waiting for ever more sorely needed solutions would be open to us," Arvo Aalto said.

"Even beforehand we can exactly guess what will happen if the Stalinists break off and form their own party. It would never become a significant political factor. Seceding from the party would be an exceptionally great misfortune for the SKP and the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL). That's also why we're not pushing the Stalinists out of the SKP," the chairman said.

If the Stalinists had achieved their objectives at the party congress, in Arvo Aalto's opinion, "a significant number of SKP rank and file probably "would have joined the SKDL and many from another group of supporters would have rallied round the SKDL.

"Pressures to turn the SKDL into its own independent, socialist party would have been strong, no matter what SKDL leaders might think," the chairman felt.

"The SKP would have shrunk into a party roughly the size of TIEDONANTAJA. And that is a part of this party of ours supported by over 100,000 Finns," Arvo Aalto said.

Finland's Middle-Class Trend

Support for the SKDL and the SKP droppeopped in recent years. In Arvo Aalto's opinion, Finland has become more conservative and middle-class values have risen to a new florescence at the same rate.

"The increase in support for the Social Democrats or the party's strengthened position in the machinery of state has not prevented this sort of development," the chairman said.

The new Communist leader has countless examples of the trend of the present course of affairs:

Differences in income are again growing, just the opposite of the 1960's and even the early 1970's.

The development toward equality has come to a standstill. Alongside bank funds, billions in so-called gray money have entered the picture, money that no laws regulate.

"About 30 percent of the banks' loan funds are now gray money, which is circulated at 15-to-17-percent interest. The exporting of capital is accelerating. Stock sales, or procuring money with money, is flourishing.

"Few cases of corruption have been turned up, just a few superficial instances, and this disclosure seems to have satisfied people...."

The chairman nevertheless saw a good side in this development:

"Another 20 years at this rate and Finland will be owned and controlled by the banks and insurance companies. Then it will be an easy matter to nationalize them; When the banks and insurance companies are nationalized, essentially the entire economy will be under national control," Arvo Aalto said.

In the chairman's opinion, unemployment is the nation's biggest problem, for the solution of which the strikes by West German metal workers may contribute new ideas.

"In the present situation in the capitalist countries unemployment cannot be resolved without considerably reducing the number of working hours.

"Investments in the environment and nature conservation have been frozen at the level they were at during the recession of the second half of the 1970's. We will soon, however, be 10 years away from that recession. If only half the gray money used to set industry in motion were invested in the environment, we could double environmental protection measures in Finland....

"Finnish society is incapable of opening channels for the influencing of citizens. At the same time people's knowledge is increased, their opportunities for directly influencing the course of affairs are few....

"In our society this is a tougher challenge than material challenges. We are now just wondering what to do, at a complete standstill. And it will come to a revolt if the only opportunity for exerting influence is a strike and a fight over money," Arvo Aalto said.

In the chairman's opinion, after the communal elections "a political alliance that might even roughly outline how Finland as a whole will be developed" will loom in our minds.

"If the SMP [Finnish Rural Party] gets in the communal elections, the government will be run in a turbulent way."

At the party congress the SKP endorsed its domestic policy objectives and no disagreement over them arose. The basic difference separating the moderates from the Stalinists will, however, pop up in the fall if they start to talk about a return to the government by the SKDL and the SKP.

"Writers and critics have a division of labor: The members of one group write books, the others criticize. In our party a clearcut majority is working on the assumption that a proxy granted by hundreds of thousands of people should be responsibly employed by influencing important issues in our society in accordance with people's hopes and needs," Arvo Aalto said.

"According to the Stalinists' basic way of thinking, criticism and the proposal of an objective and a watchword constitute an adequate policy. They regard this as being somehow incisive," the chairman remarked.

[Kyosti Karvonen]

The SKP without Stalinists wandering through the corridors of Culture House is like a cloudy day. This is what the Stalinists as well as the CPSU — and apparently many a moderate — think.

Any party whatsoever would feel orphaned if nearly half the party organization were in internal exile, as is now the case in the SKP. At least that many SKP members are behind the Stalinist districts.

The question now is under what conditions with the moderates, who have assumed an erect posture, see to it that the Stalinists return to the governing bodies of the party and whether there is room for even an inch of bargaining over Stalinist positions.

We will receive the first signs of the future Stalinist line of action from the district meetings of eight district organizations that are to meet at the end of the week.

The SKP's brand-new first secretary, Aarno Aitamurto, 47, who has surrendered the leadership of the SAK [Central Federation of Finnish Trade Unions] Construction Workers Union, is simultaneously offering the Stalinists a carrot and a stick.

"We can either call a special congress in a spirit of revenge or we can agree on matters at the congress. I think it's possible to revise the composition of the party leadership," Aitamurto ruled.

By revision Aitamurto means only supplementing the SKP Central Committee and Politburo with Stalinists. Chairman Arvo Aalto and first secretary Aitamurto's posts are not negotiable.

At last weekend's party congress the moderates offered the Stalinists 15 seats on the 50-member Central Committee, furthermore, the vice chairmanship to Veikko Alho and three or four seats in the Politburo (one was pressed on Stalinist leader Taisto Sinisalo) if the Stalinists would accept the Aalto-Aitamurto duo. The Stalinists rejected the offer.

In Aitamurto's almanac the SKP is starting out on the fourth phase of the party's history. The underground period lasted 26 years, the monolithic period 22 and the split 18 years.

"The third phase is ending, but how is a puzzle to me," Aitamurto said.

The new phase will bring with it new conditions for agreement. According to Aitamurto, agreement will not be produced in the same way as in 1970, when they got the Stalinists, who had marched out, back with the help of the CPSU and by apportioning party leadership posts.

Nor is agreement possible either in the way it was reached in 1982, when they reserved seats in the governing bodies for the Stalinists after they had

abstained. In other words, the moderates are probably not about to run after the Stalinists whining, instead waiting for them to make a move.

"The model for agreement must, among other things, include a solution to the press issue so that there are not two publications. Organizational activities must be changed so that there are not two kinds of district organizations and the central bureau must be so organized that everyone plays by the rules of the official organization. There cannot be two governing centers in the party," Aitamurto specified the terms for agreement.

In Aitamurto's opinion, the Stalinist mouthpiece, TIEDONANTAJA, and "certain other leaflets" represent the SKP's other publication.

Stigma of a Reformer

The Stalinists are capable of branding Aitamurto with the stigma of being a heavy-handed reformer for even the least little thing. The fact is that even among the moderates he is regarded as an iron-handed, outspoken steamroller. He tossed the Stalinists out of the governing bodies of the Construction Workers Union a year ago.

"I at any rate am not aiming at party reform, although there has been talk of that. The organization must be discussed. We will in accordance with our sympathies take a look at a list of names and see what jobs we ourselves will offer to each candidate," Aitamurto explained his approach.

Aitamurto's description of his functions made it clear that policy-making *per se* is chairman Aalto's province. "Of course, when you have this kind of a job, you can't remain completely on the sidelines of policy-making," Aitamurto raised the reservation.

Even the moderate Communists are concerned over the ability of the SKP's AA [Aalto-Aitamurto] movement to cooperate. Both Aalto and Aitamurto are considered to be strong-willed leaders who really have basic moderate views in common.

"If right from the start they are incapable of dividing up their duties without jurisdictional disputes, the seed of discord will have been planted," said one moderate Communist, according to whom Aalto and Aitamurto may have different views on how to promote common objectives. On the other hand, a strong Politburo that will not leave the responsibility of handling matters to the two men alone will balance the AA movement.

To be sure, the team worked well together at the party congress and during the preparations for it. Election Committee chairman Aitamurto was the kingmaker, who could have made a solo try for the king's spot.

We know that during his trip to Moscow on the eve of the party congress and even before then Aitamurto was urged to enter the race for the chairmanship. However, Aalto had a clearcut majority of the moderate delegation and that decided the outcome.

"The setup was evident as early as April. TIEDONANTAJA hugged Jouko Kajanoja to death and, on the other hand, raised the issue of Aalto's credibility among the moderates. Abandoning Aalto would have been a serious blow to the moderates — it would have given rise to the feeling that they had once again sacrificed someone," Aitamurto explained.

Aitamurto was a strong contender in the chairmanship races at the 19th party congress in 1981 and the special congress in 1982.

Those charotic congress experiences taught the moderates that the party remains in their hands and they get acceptable individuals to occupy leadership posts only by keeping their ranks tightly closed.

Estimation of Offense to CPSU

Aitamurto does not swallow the Stalinist claim that the outcome of the congress will shunt the SKP to the sidelines of foreign policy.

According to Aitamurto, at least postcongress contacts with the CPSU delegation do not support that claim. According to other moderate Communists, the CPSU appears to be holding off on taking a stand on the issue.

The moderates acquiesce in regarding the CPSU delegation's absence from the conference hall while the names of the new party leaders were read aloud on Sunday as being at the most the mildest indication that they were offended.

"CPSU-SKP relations have been continuous since the founding of the SKP and they are not dependent on just a few individuals. The 20th party congress has in no way changed these relations. It's always to our advantage for relations at the party leadership level to be good," Aitamurto said.

With its vigorous move the moderates gained the psychological and organizational upper hand and this has forced the Stalinists to set out on an utter collision course.

The moderates can alone determine the time for holding a special congress and whether the congress will be held with old or new congress delegates.

At the end of last week everything was still otherwise. In spite of the sharp rallying, about 20 deserters broke away from the ranks of the moderates and the Kainuu district slipped out of their hands — things will not be easy in future since the district committee was made up of diehard moderates. Thus a tough, exhausting struggle that will last for years would seem to be the Stalinists' only chance of capturing the party.

The Stalinists have considered the possibility of setting up their own committees alongside the district organizations controlled by the moderates. After marching out in 1969, the Stalinists established a national committee.

The Stalinists cannot forget that the moderates may resort to the same devices, that is, they may, for example, specify district boundaries as they see fit,

set up parallel organizations in Stalinist districts and make life difficult for the Stalinists by carrying out harsh congress resolutions to the letter. If the Stalinists try to change party leaders at the special congress, organization steamroller Aitamurto will have a chance to show his claws.

"I don't exclude the possibility of two parties, but it doesn't pay to speak of that as a fait accompli. We shouldn't play around with a special congress," Aitamurto warned.

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LEADING NEWSPAPER REPORTS ON COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT IN Finnish 27, 28 May 84 [no page No given]

[Article by Kyosti Karvonen, Erkki Pennanen, Janne Virkkunen, and Martti Kainulainen: "CP Majority Ranks Withstood Test"]

[Text] The Finnish Communist Party's majority ranks stayed almost completely intact when the 20th Congress of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party], which is being held in Helsinki, elected a new Central Committee for the party. Reconciliation attempts failed when Arvo Aalto was elected chairman today and the Taistoite minority was left completely out of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the party leadership.

The Communists' internal dispute came to a climax on Saturday in the election of the Central Committee, in which the policy line has become harder in the last couple years. The Taistoites refrained from participating in the 1982 congress, but their representatives were still elected to the various leadership organs. Now no mercy was shown.

At the decisive session of the congress General Secretary Aalto warded off an attempt by the minority with its previous majority position at the meeting to make the voting secret as a ballot vote.

After this, only the exclusively majority list of the election committee and the joint list of the minority as well as Kajanoja's supporters were faced off against each other. In it the minority would have taken 22 positions, Kajanoja's supporters would have been left with nine, and the majority would have received 19 positions.

The voting procedure pushed through by Aalto accelerated the course of the meeting, but at the same time ensured that the number of undecided delegates leaning toward Kajanoja was reduced to a minimum.

In the vote 13 delegates abandoned the majority ranks, but Aalto kept the majority numbers around 183--163, and one delegate abstained. Eight turncoats came from Kainuu and the remaining came from Oulu, Vaasa, Satakunta, and Pietarsaari.

A New Meeting in The Offing

The election defeat experienced by the Taistoites will not, however, result in their marching out of the congress. This was made clear by Vice-Chairman Veikko Alho, who announced that the minority will continue to participate in the course of the meeting and in its political decisionmaking process with its own proposals.

However, after a week's time the SKP minority intends to initiate actions at district meetings for the convening of an extraordinary congress.

According to SKP rules, the Central Committee must convene an extraordinary congress if six district organizations request such a meeting. The minority has control of eight districts.

Aarno Aitamurto, who was elected the new general secretary of the SKP today, was not yet willing to take a stand on a possible demand for an extraordinary congress.

When a proposal on a new meeting is received, an answer can then be given, stated Aitamurto. According to him, an extraordinary congress will, however, have a definite objective.

There must be larger issues in question than one individual (Arvo Aalto), noted Aitamurto and added that he has been dumbfounded by how the discussion at the meeting has been directed at Aalto.

The campaign of defamation against Aalto, which has lasted many months, had a completely contrary effect from what the initiators of the campaign originally had in mind, estimated Aitamurto.

According to Aitamurto, the SKP's rules do not specify a minimum time any more than a maximum time for the convening of a possible extraordinary congress. The congress can be postponed, but this issue is no joking matter, promises Aitamurto.

Aalto Was the Threshold

Aitamurto, who has come forth as kingmaker in the SKP in recent weeks, stated that relations between the majority and the minority were clarified already at the end of April when the minority announced that it will not under any circumstances approve Aalto's election.

Aitamurto mentioned that he even said that the minority is making Aalto into a threshold on which it will yet stumble. Aitamurto also wanted to refute the minority's allegations of discrimination at the congress. The minority was not according to him discriminated against, but they themselves refrained from proposing any conditions.

Aitamurto rejected as unfounded any talk according to which the majority supposedly presented the minority with a condition which would have made Aalto's

election acceptable to them. What kind of a condition is that when the majority decides, asks Aitamurto.

The SKP's future general secretary believes that the decisions of the congress will be subjected to severe criticism by the minority. "The thunderstorm is coming, but I hope that after it the calm will come."

The absence of the Taistoites and an exclusively majority party leadership can in Aitamurto's opinion mean a kind of collision course. He considered it premature to deliberate whether the majority intends to establish new district organizations in areas controlled by the minority. I do not want to prophesy a complete split, but it must always be feared, stated Aitamurto.

The majority at the SKP congress moved the Central Committee elections from Sunday to Saturday in a vote which was decisive for the whole course of the congress. In it it became clear that the minority and its Kajanoja allies did not have a majority at the congress.

Aitamurto was of the opinion that holding the elections on Sunday in accordance with the original schedule would not have altered the positions.

In addition, he stated he was somewhat afraid of the experiences of the 1982 Extraordinary Congress when the people wandered about the hallways without any knowledge of the election of a party leadership. At that meeting the third-liners succeeded in breaking the ranks of the traditional majority and this prevented Aalto's rise to the leadership of the SKP at that time.

Kajanoja Left Out for the Time Being

Jouko Kajanoja, who lost the SKP chairmanship after the Central Committee elections, announced that he does not, for the time being, intend to participate in the work of the new Central Committee.

According to Aitamurto, Kajanoja still gave his consent on Friday, but on Saturday he announced that he does not intend to be available for the time being.

The SKP Congress will continue this morning when the meeting's political decisions will be made by approving a large group of documents including decisions on party tasks, the press question, and the organizational situation and its improvement.

The Central Committee will convene today at 11:30 to elect a new Politburo, a chairman, a vice-chairman, and a general secretary for the party.

Aalto will be elected chairman, Aitamurto as general secretary, and SKP Helsinki District Chairman Helja Tammisola as vice-chairman.

The Politburo will be elected from among Central Committee members and thus only members of the majority faction will be elected to this organ, which is responsible for the SKP's practical policymaking.

Division Became Deeper

The aggravated relations between the SKP's majority and minority and the Central Committee elections meant that the Taistoites will have to remain outside of the decisionmaking organ at least until the next congress.

According to the SKP's rules, the Central Committee is elected by a congress and it cannot be altered or supplemented between congresses. According to Aitamurto, the majority also does not intend to accept minority members as observers even if they are so inclined.

Thus the formal restoration of unity to the party according to the model of a couple years ago is now impossible. The Taistoites are and will remain outside.

Kemppainen's SKP Satire: Is An Unaccomplished Act A Deed

There were no major policy speeches on the second day of the 20th SKP Congress -- unless Arvo Kemppainen's satirical deliberation of the subject "Is An Unaccomplished Act A Deed" can be considered as such.

MP Kemppainen is called a leader of the so-called axing line. He is also known as witty Kemppainen, who is replete with stories about the Soviet Union.

Kemppainen referred to a dissertation which examined, among other things, in what sense and under what conditions an unaccomplished act can be considered an accomplished deed. Kemppainen considered how the subject of the dissertation applies to the SKP.

"We Communists are all too familiar with the fact that we make good, far-reaching plans, we make good decisions... However, some act to carry out the decisions, others do not lift a finger. Even they, however, say they are carrying out the decisions. But this is not true. A decision, you see, cannot be carried out if nothing is done on its behalf," reflected Kemppainen.

Why is it this way in the SKP, asks Kemppainen.

It is easy to do nothing on behalf of a decision if the decision is not agreeable to oneself. We can make a decision which we know will be impossible to carry out. We make decisions which are only of a declarative nature, such as "Tremble America!"/Koskelankyla's Democratic Women, cracked Kemppainen in jest. "Sending such a telegram does not cost much, but it does perhaps provide for a good conscience."

Kemppainen warned the meeting against scholarly prejudgments. Such can be, for example, that the SKP will dissolve if Aalto is elected chairman and Aitamurto is elected general secretary, he stated.

When we get rid of such scholarly prejudgments, unity will be on a much stronger foundation than even on the basis of an artificial press solution," stated

Kemppainen. In his opinion, unity will not be advanced by publishing YHTEISTYÖ, which suffers from "childhood diseases".

Kemppainen recommended that YHTEISTYÖ be given the same remedy that Professor Hamalainen proposed to an old lady from Savo who came to see him because of a lingering cold. "Well, you seem to have tuberculosis, if you were a cow, you would be sent for slaughter." Vladimir Stepanov, the former ambassador to Finland and a member of the Soviet Communist Party delegation attending the congress, broke out in laughter.

Minority Calculated Desperately on Enough Turncoats in Bid To Postpone Vote

The majority in the Communist Party put all its eggs into one basket in order to determine the fate of the 20th SKP Congress already on Saturday. After some interesting turns, the effort succeeded.

The Saturday that these decisions were made happened to be the day of the Ascension of Christ or the same day that Jouko Kajanoja was surprisingly elected SKP chairman 2 years ago.

The feeling at Helsinki's House of Culture on Sturenkatu was commensurate with the day of decision. If Friday still amounted to shadowboxing and a dry run, on Saturday no holds were barred.

The preparations for a solution began on the night before in Aarno Aitamurto's committee, in which the task was to submit a proposal on the election of a party leadership. The committee was in session until early morning without accomplishing anything.

The election committee reconvened immediately in the morning, and it was decided to attempt to find a solution in a 4-man work group, which included Aitamurto and Mikko Kulmala of the majority as well as Keijo Yrjölä and Eero Tuominen of the minority.

Majority Offered, Minority Rejected

The majority, which engaged in railroading issues through at the congress more than ever before, offered the minority a power relationship of 35 to 15 in the Central Committee. The minority could take care of the so-called third-liners or take them into their ranks or discard them completely.

The majority offered minority power broker Taisto Sinisalo a position in the Politburo if the minority would swallow General Secretary Arvo Aalto's and Aitamurto's election as chairman and general secretary. The minority did not accept this proposal.

The minority had collected a list of names for the Central Committee, in which there were 28 majority members and third-liners as well as 22 minority members. The list was rejected in the committee by a vote of 14--8. The situation had reached an impasse and the majority pulled out its so-called pure list from its back pocket.

At that point a clash behind the scenes erupted into the open in the meeting hall. In order to thwart the majority's plans to push its selections through on Saturday already, the minority and the third-line attempted to gain time by demanding the formation of a new procedures committee.

Discordant sounds began to be heard in an otherwise congenial general discussion when Tutta Tallgren, a third-line member of the Politburo, went to the podium. The assistant rector of the Sirola Institute proposed "for the purpose of ensuring the unity of the congress" that it establish a procedures committee for making a proposal on the selection of a party leadership.

In Tallgren's paper it was proposed that the publication of YHTEISTYO be continued even in the future, the press decision be carried out, and actions be taken to bring an end to parallel activities. Tallgren proposed that decisions on these matters be prepared during the current year -- the final date to be determined during the congress.

The essence of this strategy was that the minority and the third-line would have obtained a majority in the committee by a vote of 11-10. The minority's appeal for the formation of a new committee 2 years ago upset the majority's plans, but this time it did not succeed.

The minority marched its delegates to the podium in support of Tallgren's proposal. Keijo Yrjola gave the assurance that the minority is not demanding a majority position in the SKP and accused the election committee of exclusionary tactics.

Yrjola said that the SKP had rejected Aalto 2 years ago already and his negative districts have only increased. Mikko Kuoppa warned that the SKP is on the brink of a split. Oili Suomi supported those proposals which were made "through Tallgren".

Helsinki District Chairman Helja Tammissola initiated the majority's counter-attack. She wondered from where the minority had received detailed information about the election committee's meeting and brought it into the assembly hall. She did not support the formation of a procedures committee, but proposed that the meeting be continued in accordance with the approved agenda. The issue was turned over to the presiding officers for deliberation.

During the lunch hour speculations began to arise as to how the vote would go. It was known for certain that among the majority delegates there were more than 10 undecided delegates who were inclined to vote with the minority.

In addition, it was known that delegates from the districts of Kainuu and Oulu were guests of the Soviet Embassy on Friday evening. A delegate from Kainuu even announced in the morning that "nearly half" of his faction or seven will support Kajanoja. It was said that CPSU representative Stefan Smirnov went to talk with the faction from Pietarsaari.

At 13:30 the temperature in the large hall of the House of Culture began to climb. The discussion was led by Aalto. He shouted to the press that the course of the meeting must not be disturbed.

Aalto, who brandished a large and red wooden gavel, announced that Tallgren's and Tammisola's proposals would be voted on by delegate factions or everyone will be subjected to the examination of his neighbor during the voting. "He even thought of that," grumbled the minority Communists in the balcony.

Aalto pushed through the support for Tammisola's proposal district by district. Finally half or eight delegates from the Kainuu District broke off and supported Tallgren's proposal. The minority districts applauded wildly.

The minority rejoiced when Pentti Kyyhkynen of the majority's Oulu District broke off from his faction and raised a red card in support of Tallgren's proposal. "Card down," roared Aalto. In addition, one turncoat each was found from the districts of Vaasa and Pietarsaari.

The meeting rejected Tallgren's proposal by a vote of 185---162 and it was decided to continue the session in accordance with the previous agenda. The minority succeeded in persuading only 11 delegates to abandon the majority ranks, which was already a harbinger of defeat for the minority in the final vote.

New Phase of Operation

The minority's Yrjola jumped up and accused Aalto of incompetency in handling the meeting. Yrjola pointed out that the Kymi District only voted on the second proposal. The minority's Jaakko Laakso demanded a chance to speak, but Aalto pounded his gavel to indicate that a decision had been reached.

The majority had passed its first ordeal by fire and moved its operation into a new phase. Timo Laaksonen from Satakunta marched to the podium and proposed a change in the agenda "for accelerating the progress of the meeting", which would facilitate the election of a Central Committee already on Saturday and thus determine the composition of the party leadership.

Again it was the minority's turn to speak. The persuasive tactics were begun by Pauli Puhakka from Joensuu, who stated that the accomplishment of the election committee's proposal would result in the split of the SKP. There is not one single minority candidate on the list, stated Puhakka.

Seppo Kortelainen from Kuopio expressed amazement at the circuitous tactics used by the majority at the meeting. Tammisola's proposal regarding the old agenda was just approved. If this is now changed, an issue that has been decided on twice already will be brought up again. This is contrary to the association's bylaws and makes the meetings legality questionable, he rattled off and announced that the majority must accept responsibility for the dissolution of the party.

Erkki Rautee, the former chief ideologist of the SKP and its current education secretary and member of the third-line, suddenly jumped to the podium. He announced that he will resign from the chairmanship of the party program committee if "this arbitrary decision is made" or if the agenda is changed. The minority applauded him wildly.

The change of the agenda was approved by a vote of 186--161 or now only 10 majority delegates crossed over to support the minority. Aalto did not hold a vote on the issue by districts, but the whole majority and minority factions had to hold up their red voting cards in quick succession.

The voting took approximately 1 hour and 10 minutes. As the voting progressed, Kajanoja, who was sitting next to Aalto, became more gloomy. Minority leader Sinisalo sat quietly in place and still had nothing to say. Arvo Kempainen, the helmsman of the so-called axing line, smiled slightly in a surly manner even though his district of Kainuu, which he leads, split in half in the vote.

Sinisalo Attacked Aalto

Once the new Central Committee was elected, minority leader Taisto Sinisalo directed the most violent attack yet from the podium against the new party leadership and particularly against Arvo Aalto without, indeed, mentioning him directly by name.

Sinisalo declared that the solutions came about within the framework of a crude attempt to acquire power by a small faction. According to Sinisalo, "those who have been defeated from the point of history" seem to be ready to commit any acts in promoting their own factional interests.

"Who is interested in whether someone declares what he will be in the next life even after death," stated Sinisalo in sneering at Aalto, who on the first day of the congress received much applause in swearing allegiance to the CPSU even after his death. "Now it is not a question of trustworthy relations built on words, but on deeds," thundered Sinisalo and gave one to understand that Aalto does not have this kind of a relationship and there are even no prospects for such.

According to Sinisalo, the solution dictated by the majority means a distrust of the CPSU and an estrangement from the international communist movement. It is a question of changing the party line, estrangement from Leninism, and an entanglement with the coat tails of the Social Democrats in the spirit of historical compromise.

Aalto Intimidated Minority With Split

There will be no return to the confusion of recent years, announced Arvo Aalto, the new chairman of the SKP, in his maiden speech to the congress immediately after being elected. Unless the party is able to travel toward a real unity from the present situation, the logic of current events will result in a split with the eight districts remaining in the minority according to Aalto.

As an answer to the threat of the eight district organizations to demand the convening of an extraordinary congress Aalto presented a counterthreat: "If the attitude toward an extraordinary congress on the part of the eight district organizations is such that will aggravate the internal conflict, there

will be no confusion about the outcome. This business will result in a final split".

Later at a press conference Aalto clarified his statement by pointing out that a new congress has the right to suspend districts. The elected Central Committee, on the other hand, does not have such a right.

Aalto gave one to understand that the mere convening of an extraordinary congress will not automatically result in the threat of expulsion. It depends on whether this occurs within the framework of aggravating the internal conflict.

According to the party rules, the convening of an extraordinary congress must be requested by six district organizations. It is anticipated that the eight minority districts will discuss this issue at meetings next weekend. However, the date for convening a new congress will be determined by the party's new Central Committee, in which the minority has no representation.

Minority Itself Chose To Remain Outside

In his speech to the congress Aalto rejected the minority's accusations that the election of the party's new leadership organs took place completely within a policy dictated by the majority. Aalto emphasized that the eight district organizations which remained outside excluded themselves from the party's leadership organs and must bear the responsibility for this action.

The events that took place in connection with the election of a new leadership were not any kind of formal and separate phenomenon, stated Aalto. They reflect the most essential content of the SKP's present situation. The party cannot continue in this way according to him.

"There will be no return to the confusion of recent years. We must travel toward a real unity from the present situation. If we are not capable of this, even the logic of present events will lead our path toward a final split."

As further proof Aalto stated that contrary to custom he quoted from Lenin and his statement "under conditions reminiscent of our present situation". According to Lenin, "a renunciation of subordination to the central leadership means a refusal to be in the party, a dissolution of the party".

In referring to conjectures concerning the future development of relations between the SKP and the CPSU the new chairman stated that he understands that the congress causes confusion in many fraternal parties and also generates assessments with respect to how the SKP and its new leadership should be approached.

Policy Line Will Not Change At All

Without wanting to predict the attitude of fraternal parties Aalto did, however, hasten to make the assurance that the SKP's line "will not change at all" in any direction in its attitude toward the CPSU and the international

communist movement. Aalto emphasized that even in the future the SKP must pay particular attention to developing mutual Finnish-Soviet relations on the strong basis of the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Pact.

Later at a press conference Aalto was asked about the attitude of the CPSU delegation at the congress toward him. Aalto answered that he was not aware of any expressions of opinion. The new party leadership was later to meet with the foreign delegations, including the CPSU delegation, which had come to the congress as guests.

Aalto refused to comment on information according to which a direct appeal had been made to him on the part of the CPSU delegation to refuse the chairmanship for the sake of restoring party unity.

Aalto made an appeal for unity to those attending the congress "for lifting the SKP out of this humiliating situation". He assured them that the congress is not closing, but, to the contrary, opening doors to those "thousands of members and tens of thousands of supporters who have lost their faith in the party because of the conflict that has continued from year to year".

Prodigal Sons Invited Home

"To them we want to say: Now is the time to return to one's own political home." He also extended a hand of cooperation to those Communists who have been sympathetic toward the views of the minority. However, later he made it clear that he has no plans to make contact with the minority.

At the press conference Aalto emphasized that the SKP will continue to carry out its previous line in all things during the term of this new leadership. He did not approve of the party being classified as a Euro-communist party, but he wanted to define it as a Finnish party.

Aalto also rejected conjectures that under his leadership the SKP would attempt to become immediately involved in government cooperation. The question is not timely according to him even if in principle the party adopts a positive attitude toward a cooperation of the left and the center -- at least not on the basis of the present government program.

Jouko Kajanoja, who lost the chairmanship struggle, made his final statement in a dejected mood, but refrained from personally attacking "Aalto's gang", as the minority did.

After this congress the question will arise as to why unity and a policy of ideals were rejected, emphasized Kajanoja and saw in the background the purges of a violent play for power and actual ideological and political policy choices.

The minority, which remained outside of the elected party organs, stayed at the congress until the end, as did the CPSU delegation led by CPSU Politburo member Mikhail Solomentsev. The congress concluded with the traditional singing of the International accompanied by a record heard over the loudspeaker.

TASS Did Not Report Aalto's Election

Moscow--"The difficulties experienced by the Finnish Communist Party in recent years became apparent during its congress. This was reflected in certain documents of the congress as well as during the election of the party's leadership organs." These two statements were contained in a 12-line comment on the SKP congress by the Soviet news agency TASS. The comment was published on Sunday evening.

The Soviet press devoted considerable space to the congress prior to this date. In its articles about the congress the Soviet press, particularly TASS and the party newspaper PRAVDA, made it clear during the course of the meeting that the Soviet Communist Party hopes that the two factions in the SKP will become reconciled while at the same time expressing support for the minority wing and former party Chairman Jouko Kajanoja.

No other actual information about what occurred in the SKP during the last days was contained in the articles submitted by TASS.

Finnish observers in Moscow believe that more thorough assessments of the events of the congress will be published only after the Soviet delegation led by CPSU Politburo member Mikhail Solomentsev has returned from Helsinki and has submitted its report on the events.

YHTEISTYÖ Paper Experienced Sudden Death

The Communist Party's weekly paper YHTEISTYÖ, which has limped along since its inception, experienced a sudden death at the SKP's 20th Congress. The majority Communists imposed a decision, on the basis of which YHTEISTYÖ will be buried by the end of June. By a vote of 186--151 the congress accepted a decision to suspend YHTEISTYÖ, which was the fruit of a press decision made last fall by the Central Committee. The press decision was the cornerstone of the unification policy presented by former Chairman Jouko Kajanoja.

However, the minority and the third-line in the press committee had to perform tricks since they had a majority because of a slip-up. Since two of the committee's members were absent, the proposal was submitted to the congress in accordance with the will of the Saarinenite majority by a vote of 9--9, which was resolved by the chairman.

The delegates from Kainuu District, who made a show of stubbornness in Saturday's voting, abstained, but one of the delegates from the majority district of Vaasa voted persistently along with the minority.

The congress is recommending the establishment of a political-theoretical organization paper as the chief organ of the Central Committee on the basis of KOMMUNISTI and PAIVAN POSTI. It is intended to begin the publication of an organizational paper in August.

In its defeated proposal the minority made a proposal in which additional time was proposed for YHTEISTYÖ on the basis of the September decision and

it also offered to carry out all the stipulations of the decision, including the cessation of TIEDONANTAJA within a year.

Ilkka Alava of the majority district of Keski-Suomi accused YHTEISTYÖ of harassing the party leadership. YHTEISTYÖ, which engaged in "unfortunate adventurism", was not the chief organ of the Central Committee, but of the paper's editorial staff, scolded Alava.

Into the Government, But Not with the Conservatives

With just as clear a majority vote the congress approved a domestic policy document, which adopts a traditionally positive attitude toward government cooperation with the SDP and the center. There is no room for both the SKP and the Conservative Party in the same government.

The SKP is making it known that it opposes the policies of the present government and does not intend to support it any more from within the government than from opposition. According to the document, the SKP will not enter the government by abandoning its views and will not submit to becoming an apologist for bourgeois policy.

A decision on the adoption of an attitude toward government policy will be made according to the document in the SKP Central Committee "while taking the opinions of the broadest possible membership into consideration".

The strictly controlled majority district of Helsinki submitted its own proposal to the committee as the government stand, in which the threshold for participation in government was defined. The proposal failed in the committee after several majority delegates crossed over to support the minority.

The minority attempted to obtain a stricter government position in the committee report, but the proposal was not accepted. The document was submitted to the congress on Sunday where it was rejected in spite of the slip-up committed by the majority front. Likewise the majority defeated the minority's proposal for changes in the vote.

An End to Parallel Activities

The decisions adopted also included a strongly worded organization policy document, according to which the SKP will not allow within its ranks separate activities contrary to party decisions.

That which is to come is defined by, among other things, the point in the decisions in which the Central Committee is urged to adopt measures for ensuring that "the control of party work occur in accordance with Central Committee decisions in all district organizations". A positive attitude toward the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] was adopted.

The organizational policy document calls the SKP a modern Leninist party of the masses, whose activities are based on the doctrines of Marx, Engels, and Lenin while applying them to the modern world.

As far as cooperation with fraternal parties is concerned, the SKP proceeds from jointly accepted standards, for which party independence, noninterference in the internal affairs of another party, equality, and a responsibility to seek and accomplish national objectives, among other things, are characteristic.

Comradely Relations with the CPSU

As far as cooperation with the CPSU is concerned, the SKP proceeds from "the premise of comradeship, mutual trust, and proletarian internationalism". The minority's proposals for change were rejected by the majority front, in which Kainuu's third-liners once again abstained.

The congress nailed down the question of the methods used in selecting delegates, which has caused bickering in the SKP for many months. It was unanimously decided that one delegate for each 100 party members will be elected to the 21st Congress. Previously the majority held to the view that delegates to this congress be elected on the basis of one for each 100 representatives of a district organization

The conflict concerned the Hakala and Viirinkangas sections of the Lapland District and Yleisradio section of Helsinki District. They are not members of the district, but belong to the party. Minority member Benjamin Reittu was supported by Chairman Arvo Aalto so that the issue was clear. Minority member Hannu Nieminen asked why the issue had to be argued in the Central Committee for months at a time.

Backbone

"I have told those comrades who have doubted Arvo Aalto that he has the good qualification of having political brains." This is how a satisfied Aarne Saarinen described his successor as SKP chairman in the corridors of the House of Culture.

Saarinen's words contained many truths. They reflect the fact that Aalto is not an individual beyond dispute in the ranks of the Saarinenite majority. They also say that Aalto has the most experience among current majority leaders in party and government work.

Without being guilty of exaggeration it can be said that Arvo Aalto is the backbone of the Saarinenite majority; the only individual around whom that group which has been responsible for the party since 1966 could come together as a unified group.

Arvo Aulis Aalto, 51, a bricklayer from Lapland, joined the Communist Party in 1952. However, he soon left construction work since the party needed a permanent organization man.

Aalto became the district secretary of Lapland in 1959. Ten years later he was elected general secretary at a meeting from which the minority walked out.

Aalto, who observes the world from under bushy Brezhnev-like eyebrows, tried to become SKP chairman 2 years ago already, but the majority's ranks splintered at the chaotic Extraordinary Congress.

This time with his staff Aalto made certain in advance already that this will not be repeated. SKP Chairman Aalto inherited that seemingly impossible task in which Aarne Saarinen failed or the subordination of the Taistoite minority to party discipline. Jouko Kajanoja did not even attempt this, but he sincerely tried to unite the party by closing his eyes to the deep factional division.

In the Communist Party, Aalto, whom some have nicknamed prince, is known as a short-tempered man. Many have frequently experienced the effectiveness of his wrath.

On Sunday Aalto pushed through the appointment of the Politburo with the same effectiveness in the Central Committee while some attempted to initiate a discussion on the issue. Shall we not approve the proposal of the election committee, stated Aalto and all the others had to be satisfied with this.

Arvo Aalto has had government experience since 1977 when he was the labor minister in the governments of Kalevi Sorsa and Mauno Koivisto.

At that time even the people could see Aalto in coat and tails demonstrating an enviable dancing skill at Independence Day receptions in the presidential palace.

Organization Man

The SKP's Taistoites say that they are on their guard against Chairman Arvo Aalto for political reasons. The suspicions directed toward minority General Secretary Aarno Aitamurto are most likely of an organizational nature especially since the weekend.

The largest Communist-led trade union of the SAK [Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions], the Construction Workers' Union, has since 1970 been led by Aitamurto, who is a strict organization man and who expelled Taistoite officials from the union a year ago. If the minority so desires, the same can be done in the SKP.

Bricklayer-politician Aalto's partner will be Assistant Judge and organization man Aitamurto, whose primary task in the SKP in the near future will most likely be to put the organizational machinery in working order.

Mikhail Suslov, the late chief ideologist of the CPSU, was called a kingmaker. The same mantle can now be offered to Aitamurto, who remained loyal to Aalto contrary to the wishes of the minority. According to Aitamurto, it has been evident for months that Aalto will become chairman and not he.

Aitamurto, who joined the SKP in 1961, ensured Aalto's key position in his election committee, in which he did not succumb to the minority's tricks with

the strong will of an experienced labor negotiator. In 1982 Aalto's ascent fell through due to the failure of the majority in the election committee.

Aitamurto himself was a strong candidate for the chairmanship in 1981 and in 1982 particularly in the designs of the so-called axing-line districts of the North. He even had support now, but Aalto had more. Aitamurto, who was depicted as a "serious and abrupt individual" and as a thinker by KANSAN UUTISEN columnist Mauri Sierno, was satisfied with what, for its part, guaranteed the stability of the majority's ranks.

Jouko Kajanoja earned the title "well-read Communist" as the son of a bourgeois household in Helsinki. As an attorney Aitamurto is just as well-read, but he knows the handbook of the Communist Party's strict organizational activities better than Kajanoja.

Even in the opinion of the Taistoites, Aitamurto "spoke well" of the SKP's and SKDL's relations in negotiations held during the recent visit of the CPSU's delegation. Cooperation between Aalto and SKDL Chairman Kalevi Kivisto (People's Democrat) is very good -- it remains to be seen how much Aitamurto will participate in daily politics and how he will interpret the SKP's position in the SKDL.

Before his chairmanship Aitamurto was an attorney for the Construction Workers' Union for 7 years. He represents Northern Finnish communism, which measured by SKP standards is more majority-oriented than anything else.

Majority Won -- Now What

The traditional Saarinenite majority regained power after a couple of years of uncertainty at the 20th SKP Congress. The Taistoites and the third-line, which broke off from the majority, remained outside of all leadership organs.

Thus the majority won a factional victory since the minority did not consent to weakening its positions. The insurmountable threshold was the ascent of Arvo Aalto to the chairmanship and thus the minority stumbled on this threshold. Aalto was elected and Jouko Kajanoja was dropped.

After a heated weekend at the House of Culture it is time to ask what the majority will do with the SKP and what the minority will do. If there are any plans, Aalto did not reveal them. He was satisfied with reiterating that the former state of confusion will not continue.

In many respects the new majority party leadership will find itself in a difficult situation. The SKP's international position is not the least of them. The powerful Soviet Communist Party indicated already on Sunday that it is not happy with the decisions made by the majority at the congress.

The minority's view of the situation is clear. The choices of the congress cut off the party from the working class and the international communist movement, as former party Vice-Chairman Veikko Alho describes the situation. The speeches in the corridors were even stronger and they were also promoted by the third-liners.

However, it is too early to assess whether the minority's view of the SKP's estrangement from the international movement is correct. The beginning of an ice age is possible even though the victorious majority does not believe this.

The SKP did not split at the congress. The minority, which remained outside of leadership positions, announced that it will stay in the party. Thus the Taistoites will continue persistent exhaustion tactics and await the further splintering of the majority, which as it becomes more pervasive would change the power relationships in the party. This spring the majority had real difficulties in keeping control of the Kainuu District, which is sliding toward the third-liners.

The transformation of the party's internal division into two communist parties has been the primary goal of the CPSU and in light of the 20th Congress this seems to apply to the minority also even though there were pressures in some of its districts.

The deep trenches dug during the internal conflict that began in 1966 continue to be a burden for the new SKP leadership. The struggle in the party continues.

The SKP's minority announced that it will demand an extraordinary congress after 6 months with new delegates. However, Aalto stated straight out that if this demand means an aggravation of the internal conflict, this venture will result in a final split.

The Central Committee can decide on convening an extraordinary congress with the old delegates, at which time an extraordinary congress could, if necessary, expel the Taistoite district organizations from the party.

The SKP's Saarinenite majority put all its efforts into the election at the 20th Congress and was able to maintain a majority.

At the congress the minority allied itself with the third-liners supporting Jouko Kajanoja and this alliance was only 10 votes away from a majority at the congress.

If a final split were to occur in the SKP, Finland would follow the example of many European countries, which would mean a larger national communist and a smaller pro-Moscow party.

The election of a new party leadership will also influence the affairs of the SKDL and the municipal election campaign. In many places there is a danger that the Communists will enter the elections on various lists.

SKDL Chairman Kalevi Kivisto was obviously elated about the decisions of the congress and he predicted that the twin team of Aalto--Kivisto will march to the same drummer.

On the other hand, it will be interesting to see what will happen in the SKDL's parliamentary faction, in which the Taistoites and those MP's sympathetic to the third-line are almost in a majority.

Government Tempting

In Finland's domestic policy the SKP's decisions will have an effect primarily on government policy. The SKP's new leadership supports a more distinct cooperation of the left and the center at the government level.

It considers that the country's affairs can be influenced from the government while, on the other hand, the party's minority assumes a negative attitude toward government responsibility under present conditions. Aalto's SKP will probably strive to grease the axle of cooperation with the Social Democrats.

All this does not, however, mean that the SKP will march victoriously into the government after the municipal elections if a government reform is carried out.

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CSO: 3617/166

PCF POLLED ON UNIONS, INDUSTRIAL REFORM, POLITICAL ISSUES

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[Text] The poll presented in this special issue of AUTRES MONDES was conducted in cooperation with the Institute for Socioprofessional Communication and Economic and Social Research--the ICSP/RES--and the editorial staff of AUTRES MONDES. It was taken from 26 February to 26 March 1984 among a representative sampling of 1,000 PCF members.

Never before had such a poll been conducted. It included communists, not communist sympathizers or voters presumed to be communists or who said they were such. These communists are PCF members and, moreover, they are active militants or even activists. In fact, they support the party financially and thus their opinions take on special significance. People do not contribute materially to an organization without being associated with it, without identifying with it, with its slogans and with its leaders. The primary selection criteria of those polled was their participation in contributing to the financial support of the PCF.

The results obtained cannot be compared to those of other polls, since no precedent exists. Comparisons of views on this or that issue, based on answers supplied on other occasions by individuals who said they were PCF voters or were close to the party, could not be conclusive. The motivations of a communist voter do not necessarily correspond to the concerns of a PCF member/militant. It may even happen that they are basically opposed, while being in accord at the time of an election. Such a phenomenon cannot be cited concerning the answers listed here: communists have expressed their opinions on issues involving them directly and in doing so they have definitely expressed the mood and contradictions of a party most often considered by outsiders as being united and undivided in its thoughts and actions.

This poll raises a preliminary question. How was this poll possible; is it based on "police file" procedures that cannot be disclosed; is it justifiable in its very principle?

Methodology Used

The way in which the poll was conducted is based on the strictest common practices in this regard and this is not the place to list them. An expert and

highly demanding commission keeps watch over polling institutions and the preparation of their surveys. The press has also proved to be fierce when it comes to surveys conducted on the basis of questionable or overly limited samplings and there are some recent examples of various organizations being ripped apart by the press. On such an issue, the reader should therefore expect that all precautions have been taken and that the strictest rules have been observed, even beyond the letter. Only one point deserves consideration and discussion: determination of the lists of people contacted.

For several decades--except during periods of secrecy and active pursuit by the courts and the police--the PCF has published lists of militants contributing to the party's financial support. Such contributions are of several different types: they may be contributions to support the party's publications or to finance a given election campaign, or the two combined. At certain times, the lists published were incomprehensible to non-PCF members. To a large extent, they consisted of lists of cells and sections and of individuals represented by initials or a first name followed by a place name. It proved difficult to derive any useful information about the general organization of the PC and the actual dynamics of its structures. At other times--this has been the case for several years--the lists have been arranged by departments, by communes within departments and next to the amount of sums submitted to the Central Committee treasurer by federations, municipal committees, sections and cells are the first and last names of persons who are often well known in their respective localities. The members and militants thus listed make no secret of their PCF membership (among them is a nonnegligible percentage of local elected officials). And in a case where there could be a problem, the donor specified that he did not want his name listed, thus we find more or fewer "anonymous" and "reader" listings without further information. However, for someone who wishes to aid the PC financially while remaining unknown, the simplest way would be to submit cash to party officials or to the sales outlets of L'HUMANITE-DIMANCHE.

Persons listed by the communist press when contributions are made affirm that they are committed communists and wish to make this known, not only within their organization but also to outsiders as a result of having their names published. This is their right and the series of lists supplied in relation to the election schedule finally gave us the idea of asking these communists, who are proud of their affiliation, what they thought about current problems and particularly about the economic and social policy of the present government, of which their party is a minority component. The documents used to contact them were, quite obviously, the lists of contributors. From 1 October 1981 to 1 February 1982, for example, the PC published 88 lists of this kind. The only requirement for using them amounted to consulting telephone directories in order to be able to question the persons selected. The sole selection criteria was that there could be no confusion with any other person's name: the PC lists posed no major problem from this standpoint.

Thus the survey was not intended to be any kind of compilation of "files" on PC militants, since communist contributors, on the contrary, make no secret of their political affiliation, which they try to make as public as possible. Nor was it intended to be a "political" operation, since the questions asked were not formulated to "challenge" the convictions of those polled. Their

exclusively informative character derives from the very way in which they are formulated and none of the persons polled questioned either their form or content.

Respect for the anonymity of those polled, so important in polls for assessing events and leaders, thus takes on apparently secondary importance here. But the necessary precautions were obviously taken to prevent anyone from possibly making a connection between a given questionnaire and the individual answering it, so that no one would be able to accuse someone of having taken a certain position. We might add that the lists checked for the survey represented a total of about 12,000 proper names. Only 1,000 were selected and even their disclosure, combined with a knowledge of the lists selected, would not enable anyone to identify this or that person polled.

The communists have always affirmed that they are French men and women like other citizens and that they are being falsely accused when someone claims that their party, and consequently its members, are "separate" from the nation as a whole. We wished to take them at their word by treating communist members in the same way as the average French citizen, who is liable to be asked about his opinions at any time by an interviewing pollster. It is true, of course, that the communists polled were questioned without being informed that only members of their party had been selected. Informing them of this would have led to two kinds of reactions: either an outright refusal to respond, the most likely attitude toward an initiative not coming from the PC leadership; or stereotyped answers artificially "in line" with the party's current policy and whose importance would have been nil.

One person polled thanked, with obvious sincerity, the pollster who had contacted him for having given him the opportunity to express his personal view as a communist militant on important current issues, even if it was through the common body of several hundred other individual opinions. We will surprise none of our readers by pointing out that our approach to surveying communist activities is not basically sympathetic. But in this particular instance, we reject any possible accusations of having tried to "put one over" on the PC or of having been tempted by "investigative," not to mention police, journalism. The survey summarized here was intended, under the country's current conditions, to gain a better understanding of communist reality in order to locate its ideas, among others, along the axis of French politics, at least since 1972: the time of the PC/PS coalition. If the result is a more varied picture of communists than imagined by those outside this party, we categorically reject the accusation that an attempt was made to dissociate communist militants and their national leadership. In everything that the party has written about itself, PC headquarters has declared thousands of times that the description of the communist world as an undifferentiated monolith was unfair. In a way which we consider irrefutable, we are providing, for the first time since the PC was established in France, a survey making it possible to judge this, a survey that can be challenged even less since it was conducted from outside the PC. Obviously, we do not expect the PCF's headquarters to acknowledge this, but we nevertheless reject in advance any suspicious objections, regardless of their origin, disputing the usefulness and implementation of this survey.

Breakdown of Persons Polled

Of a total of 1,000:

Sex

Men	774
Women	234

Age

18-24 Years Old	15
25-44 " "	396
45-54 " "	238
60 " " and older	351

Socioprofessional Categories [CSP]

Farmers (AG)	10
Industrial & Commercial Employers (PIC)	12
Liberal Professions/Higher Management (PLCS)	92
Middle Management (CM)	134
Employees (E)	345
Workers/Service Personnel (OPS)	73
Unemployed (Retired) (INC)	334

Note: In the case of persons providing financial support to the PC, the small percentage of young people (11.8 percent of PC members according to the PC in 1979, only 1.5 percent of those interviewed) will not be surprising.

In its sociological analysis in 1979, the PC stated that it consisted of 35.7 percent women. It would have to be concluded from the 23.4 percent of women polled that men, in the case of public records of party life, are more in the forefront. According to the same survey, persons over the age of 60 represented about 14 percent of members. They constitute 35.1 percent of those polled: this fact takes on special significance in the communist context. In general, they are the most active members of the PC since they are very available, the most disciplined and the most receptive to key national ideas.

Workers appear to be underrepresented (7.3 percent): the PC says that its percentage of workers is 51 percent, "if we include certain categories of technicians, production management personnel and employees who belong to the working class." Such a definition leaves the door open for all "arrangements" and permits no comparison. The PC notes that the number of employees and intellectuals in its ranks is on the rise, "in this regard, following not only the general development of French society, but also, in a certain way, the political course which the PCF has set for itself." In any case, the employee group constitutes the largest group in the survey: 34.5 percent. Employees, workers

and middle management combined total 55.2 percent, which is not far removed from the 51 percent "working class" claimed by the PC by including most managerial personnel and employees.

Note: The PCF's female membership is lowest between the ages of 25 and 44, which can be explained by the rearing of children in particular. If it tends to become more pronounced again after the age of 60, it is highest between the ages of 18 and 24. Some "housewives" seem willing to militate since, as the following table shows, the percentage of women is 32.3 percent among "unemployed."

Categories: CSP According to Sex
(Number of Persons Polled)

CSP	Men	Women	Total	
			%	Percent of Sampling
Agri	90,0	10,0	100	1,0 %
PIC	91,7	8,3	100	1,2 %
PLCS	87,0	13,0	100	9,1 %
CM	82,8	17,2	100	13,3 %
E	77,1	22,9	100	34,2 %
OPS	91,8	8,2	100	7,3 %
INC	67,7	32,3	100	34,0 %
Total	76,7	23,3		

Determination Criteria

Contacting communists by following the easiest approach, i.e., by questioning only those in the Paris area, for example, would have detracted from the survey's significance. In order to give as much consideration as possible to the famous "diversity of communists" claimed by the PC, it was appropriate to take a poll of all of France. There was one specific limitation: the number of communists in each department and their percentage in relation to their total number. If the PC publishes its national membership roll every year, it does not provide a breakdown by department, however. The latest data available for most communist federations date back to late 1977-early 1978 and this data had to be used as a basis. Since total membership has remained stable since 1977, the percentage of departmental variation could be considered relatively negligible (except for the city of Paris, which was shaken by the exclusion of the Fiszbin group;

but that affair dates back to 1979/80 and its effects on members have since diminished).

Differences of opinion and notable disparities are noticeable according to region. In order not to make the presentation of this poll cumbersome, regional tables have not been included. However, they are available on request from AUTRES MONDES-SARLES, 47 Rue Richer, 75009 Paris.

PC Members and Economic Policy

Without going back over the proceedings of the 24th PCF Congress (February 1982) or even earlier, a reading of communist pamphlets, brochures and newspapers of recent months does not suffer from a contradictory interpretation of a specific point: the rejection of business layoffs, the refusal to accept the notion of "overstaffing." The PC asserts that recovery must be achieved through industrial growth, by maintaining and developing purchasing power; in its view, massive numbers of people can and should be hired. Every communist is convinced that the basic superiority, at least morally, of Eastern countries lies in the fact, which they accept without having any control over it, of the nonexistence of unemployment within their borders.

"Capitalism is the scourge of unemployment. Achieving French-style socialism means giving real priority to employment in economic strategy by making it the decisive goal, from the outset, of all planning and direction. This implies a new productivity. This can lead, for example, in certain cases, to choosing techniques that would maintain or create good jobs in preference to other techniques that would eliminate them." (G. Marchais, 24th PCF Congress, CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME, p 31)

Category: Age According to Sex
(Number of Persons Polled)

Age	Men	Women	Total	
			%	Percent of Sampling
18/24	66,7	33,3	100	1,5 %
25/44	80,8	19,2	100	39,3 %
45/59	78,6	21,4	100	23,6 %
60 & +	71,9	28,1	100	35,7 %
Total	76,7	23,3		

"We currently have zero growth. The trend must be reversed: an employment policy based on growth is the only answer to our country's present situation."
(G. Marchais, Channel 2, 2 April 1984)

PC militants are experiencing this formulation of policy in many actions begun years ago throughout the country to prevent layoffs and to occupy businesses considerable unviable. Thus the answer of 1,000 of them to the first question in the poll is significant:

Question 1: There is a great deal of talk about overstaffing in industrial sectors such as shipyards, the iron and steel industry, automobile manufacturing, etc. Do you, personally, think that:

Yes, there is overstaffing	12.4%
No, there isn't overstaffing	63.8%
It is one of several factors	17.7%
No Opinion [NOP]	5.1%

At first glance, PC members exhibit a notable consistency: however, if we total up all those who do not reject the notion in question, we obtain a large minority of 36.2 percent. More than one-third of communists, on a problem related to very well-known cases of opinion and to dramatic aspects, do not automatically react like they are supposed to. A percentage of 63.8 could not be considered satisfactory by the PC leadership on the key point of its industrial strategy. In the case of specific actions, of course, it is likely that all communists follow or will follow the directives of PCF headquarters. But when broken down according to socioprofessional categories, we note that workers identify more than others with rejection of the notion of overstaffing. Moreover, another disturbing sign for the PC lies in the differentiated views of its members according to their ages. The younger they are, the less they reject the notion of overstaffing.

Question 1: There is a great deal of talk about overstaffing in industrial sectors such as shipyards, the iron and steel industry, automobile manufacturing, etc. Do you, personally, think that:

	Total	CSP						
		AG	PIC	PL.CS	CM	E et al	OPS	INC
Yes, there is overstaffing	12,4	10,0	8,3	19,6	17,2	7,2	8,2	14,9
No, there isn't overstaffing	63,8	50,0	50,0	58,7	67,2	53,9	82,2	71,3
It is one of several factors	18,7	10,0	33,3	13,0	10,4	35,9	5,5	8,2
No opinion	5,1	30,0	8,4	8,7	5,2	3,0	4,1	5,6

Question 1: There is a great deal of talk about overstaffing in industrial sectors such as shipyards, the iron and steel industry, automobile manufacturing, etc. Do you, personally, think that:

	Total	AGE GROUP			
		18-24	25-44	45-59	60 & Over
Yes, there is overstaffing	12,4	20,0	8,3	17,2	13,4
No, there isn't overstaffing	63,8	53,3	53,5	69,3	72,4
It is one of several factors	18,7	26,7	33,3	8,4	8,8
No opinion	5,1		4,9	5,1	5,4

Question 2: For those who gave answers 2 and 3 to the preceding question: Do you think, then, that this problem is due to:

	Total	CSP						
		AG	PIC	PLCS	CM	E. et al	OPS	INC
Poor Corporate Management	23,8	10,0	25,0	22,8	23,1	20,9	31,5	25,3
Government Responsibility prior to 10 May 1981	41,6	60,0	50,0	37	47,8	34,2	43,8	46,6
The Current Government's Responsibility	4,2	-	-	4,3	3,7	3,5	8,2	4,6
No Opinion	30,4	30,0	25,0	35,9	25,4	41,4	16,5	23,5

Question 2: For those who gave answers 2 and 3 to the preceding question:
Do you think, then, that this problem is due to:

	Total	AGE GROUP			
		18-24	25-44	45-59	60 & Over
Poor Corporate Management	23,8	40,0	19,2	23,1	27,8
Government Responsibility Before 10 May 1981	41,6	33,3	35,4	45,8	46,9
The Current Government's Responsibility	4,2	6,7	3,3	6,3	3,7
No Opinion	30,4	20,0	42,1	24,8	21,6

Question 3: Trade union opinion are divided on this issue. In your opinion, which trade union holds the position most favorable to the interests of wage earners in these sectors?

	Total	CSP						
		AG	PIC	PLCS	CM	E. et al	OPS	INC
CGT	73,8	80,0	66,7	71,7	80,6	59,1	79,5	85,4
CFDT	2,4	-	8,3	5,4	5,2	1,2	2,7	1,2
FO	4,0	-	25,0	9,8	2,2	2,6	5,5	3,7
CFTC	0,5	-	-	1,1	0,7	0,6	1,4	-
CGC	0,8	-	-	2,2	-	0,6	-	1,2
NSP	18,5	20,0	-	9,8	11,3	35,9	10,4	8,5

The strictly political conclusions to be drawn from the answers to question 1 emerge in the details requested in question 2:

Those who attribute to "capitalism," represented either by company managements or by the government prior to 10 May 1981, the responsibility for the situation of industrial sectors in crisis constitute 66.4 percent of those polled. If we consider that the 4.2 percent accusing the new government are probably doing so because of its lack of energy in the "change" and in the fight against

"employers" and the "right," the percentage is 70.6. However, a new minority of 30.4 percent "without any opinion" nevertheless emerges. However, those who believed that there was overstaffing were not asked to answer question 2. The PC's traditional explanations of the origin of current problems no longer satisfy all its members. As for the Coalition of the Left, which has become the government, for the time being it is accused only by less than 5 percent of communists. The major significance of this fact is obvious, even though the question's formulation also included the PC, a partner in the government.

Question 3: Trade union opinions are divided on this issue. In your opinion, which trade union holds the position most favorable to the interests of wage earners in these sectors?

	Total	AGE GROUP			
		18-24	25-44	45-59	60 & Over
CGT	73,8	53,3	58,6	79,8	87,5
CFDT	2,4	13,3	2,3	4,2	0,9
FO	4,0	13,3	3,98	3,4	4,3
CFTC	0,5	-	1,0	0,4	-
CGC	0,8	-	0,3	1,7	0,9
NSP	18,5	20,1	34	10,5	6,4

Question 15: Do you have a very good, good, average, poor or very poor opinion of each of the following trade union figures?

	<u>V. Good</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Avg.</u>	<u>Poor</u>	<u>V. Poor</u>	<u>NOP</u>
H. KRASUCKI	27,5 %	38,4 %	18,8 %	3,9 %	2,7 %	8,7 %
E. MAIRE	0,8 %	12 %	46 %	24,4 %	7,7 %	9,1 %
A. BERGERON	1 %	7,1 %	25,3 %	33,6 %	22,6 %	10,4 %
J. BORNARD	0,1 %	2,6 %	20,5 %	23,2 %	16,1 %	37,5 %
P. MARCHELLI	0,2 %	2,1 %	18,4 %	21,5 %	28,6 %	29,2 %

The breakdown according to age groups shows notable variations which are twice as great in the case of company management responsibilities and substantial differences of opinion according to socioprofessional categories are noticeable. The present government's policy is blamed by 8.2 percent of workers, as opposed to 4.2 percent on the average.

Communists and Trade Unions

The government's social and economic policy cannot be judged apart from its trade union background. It seemed useful to determine whether current opinions concerning trade union sympathies of communists could be verified. The results will apparently hold no surprises.

A massive consensus, accentuated by the answers to the more general question 5, emerges in this instance.

Even if the percentage is still very small, we nevertheless note a symptomatic variation concerning the CGC [General Confederation of Managerial Personnel]. However, there isn't total PC/CGT correspondence. Slightly more than 18 percent of communists did not express their opinions and about 7.5 percent favored a confederation other than Henri Krasucki's. This is not in proportion, since one out of four communists maintains reservations concerning the CGT.

The positions taken on the "personalized" question 15 confirm, as it happens, the reservations of one-fourth of PC members concerning the CGT. The 25.4 percent negative opinions on CGT General Secretary Henri Krasucki are even more surprising, since he is also a member of the PC Political Bureau at the same time.

If CGC Chairman P. Marchelli has the highest "very poor" rating (28.6 percent), Workers Force [FO] General Secretary Andre Bergeron nevertheless received the most negative opinions: a total of 81.5 percent. The CFTC is hardly noticed by communists, 37.5 percent of whom are unaware of it. In the case of the CFDT, E. Maire received a 12.8 percent minority of favorable opinions: does he owe them to his trade union program or to his public image of being "close" to a certain PS faction?

Age group breakdowns on these questions have some disturbing features for the CGT. The older members are, the closer they are to it. Communists between the ages of 18 and 24 look more than others toward the CFDT and FO. PC employees, without other commitments, have a more pronounced passive attitude toward the CGT.

When communists were asked a question about trade union and political relations, there should have been no subtle differences in their answers. Since the summer of 1981, the CGT has been proclaiming that it would not give to the Coalition of the Left government what it was unwilling to give to the former majority. Henri Krasucki sounded the alarm concerning the government on 6 February 1984. Did he convince a lot of people? At any rate, to a large extent communists seem gripped by surprising doubts.

The percentages of organizations other than the CGT are minimal, of course; however, the fact that 54.3 percent of communists do not believe that the CGT is the "most independent" of trade union confederations, despite what the PC and CGT constantly assert, says a lot about the interpenetration between that party and that trade union. Even a majority of communists question the autonomy of the CGT ... in relation to their own party, in fact.

Question 3: Trade union opinions are divided on this issue. In your opinion, which trade union has adopted the position most favorable to the interests of wage earners in these sectors?

CGT	73.8%
CFDT	2.4%
FO	4%
CFTC	0.5%
CGC	0.8%
No Opinion	18.5%

Question 7: To which of the following trade union organizations do you feel closest?

CGT	73.2%
CFDT	2.8%
FO	3.4%
CFTC	0.6%
CGC	1.7%
No Opinion	18.3%

Question 9: In your opinion, which trade union organization is most independent of the government?

CGT	45.7%
CFDT	1.4%
FO	5.9%
CFTC	1.3%
CGC	4.2%
No Opinion	41.5%

Question 10: Do you consider the current demands of government officials to be a form of corporatism, of social egotism?

Yes	16.8%
No	66.8%
No Opinion	16.4%

On this point, the age group table shows a doubly disturbing phenomenon in the attitude of the youngest communists: the socioprofessional breakdown shows that 60 percent of employees and similar groups are not convinced that the CGT is totally independent of the government.

The positions taken on the complaints of civil servants, on the other hand, appear to be more in line with the protection of purchasing power, as advocated by the PC and CGT:

Question 9: In your opinion, which trade union organization is most independent of the government?

Total		AGE GROUP			
		18-24	25-44	45-59	60 & Over
CGT	45,7	20,0	34,3	50,0	56,5
CFDT	1,4	-	1,3	2,5	0,9
FO	5,9	33,3	5,6	6,7	4,8
CFTC	1,3	6,7	1,8	1,3	0,6
CGC	4,2	13,3	4,5	2,9	4,3
No Opinion	41,5	26,7	52,5	36,6	33,1

Total		CSP						
		AG	PIC	PL-CS	CM	E. et al	OPS	INC.
CGT	45,7	30,0	41,7	37,00	48,5	40,0	57,5	50,9
CFDT	1,4	-	-	2,2	1,5	1,4	1,4	1,2
FO	5,9	-	16,7	8,7	11,2	3,2	11,0	4,9
CFTC	1,3	-	8,3	5,4	-	0,6	2,7	0,9
CGC	4,2	-	-	6,5	6,7	3,2	2,7	4,3
No Opinion	41,5	70,0	33,3	40,2	32,1	51,6	24,7	37,8

Question 8: Which demand should be given preference in the order of priorities?

Reduction of working hours	11.6%
Protection of purchasing power	34.2%
Working conditions	2.5%
Expression of wage earners	2.3%
Right to examine management	7.1%
Job protection	36.1%
No opinion	6.2%

But here again, a minority of 33.2 percent adopted a wait-and-see position or went against official policy. One out of three communists no longer seems to be an unquestioning supporter of purchasing power and the "dominant ideology," symbolized by the "always more" of F. de Closets seems to have led to some

defections in PC ranks (see question 10). A generation-gap problem within the PC emerges when we look at age variations and noticeable variations are apparent in the socioprofessional table.

A social and economic policy must take into account the most popular demands and those supported by the PC could well receive a maximum response. Thus priority in this area takes on special importance.

The two main demands are concerned with the protection of jobs and purchasing power. The watchword of "new managers" dear to Philippe Herzog and the staff of *ECONOMIE ET POLITIQUE*, the PC's Marxist economic journal, received only a very modest response, as did the expression of wage earners (2.3 percent of those polled). If the PC does not manage to couple its order to "seize new rights" with the mundane, but certainly more pressing concerns of its members, it may well be operating largely in a void in the context of businesses. The 25-44 age group of communists differs very markedly from other groups with regard to its preferred demands.

The socioprofessional breakdown holds some surprises: thus the unemployed, representing 44.8 percent, are most concerned with job protection, whereas employees give the least priority to this demand (24.9 percent).

The information provided by question 11 on purchasing power throws light on the real importance which communists attribute to its protection. Although, in this case as well, we find that nearly one-third of them do not follow the general trend, the very high percentage who consider purchasing power to be declining represents much more than a group perception phenomenon. In the intermediate term, this is a serious danger to the Coalition of the Left, even if the political conclusions of this perception have not yet been drawn by the PC or by its members:

Question 10: Do you consider the current demands of government officials to be a form of corporatism, of social egotism?

Total		AGE GROUP			
		18-24	25-44	45-59	60 & Over
Yes	16,8	26,7	16,2	17,6	16,5
No	66,8	60,0	53,8	73,1	77,3
No Opinion	16,4	13,3	30,0	9,3	6,2

Question 10: Do you consider the current demands of government officials to be a form of corporatism, of social egotism?

Total		CSP						
		AG	PIC	PL-CS	CM	E. et al	OPS	INC.
Yes	16,8	50,0	25,0	29,3	14,9	11,6	26,0	15,5
No	66,8	50,0	58,3	62,0	74,6	56,2	65,8	77,1
No Opinion	16,4	—	16,7	8,7	10,5	32,2	8,2	7,4

Question 8: Which demand should be given preference in the order of priorities?

Total		CSP						
		AG	PIC	PL-CS	CM	E. et al	OPS	INC.
Reduction of Working Hours	11,6	30,0	16,7	10,9	10,4	8,7	12,3	13,4
Protection of Purchasing Power	34,2	20,0	25,0	18,5	29,1	50,4	37,0	23,5
Working Conditions	2,5	10,0	—	3,3	2,2	0,9	1,4	4,3
Expression of Wage Earners	2,3	—	—	3,3	2,2	2,3	1,4	2,4
Right to Examine Management	7,1	—	8,3	9,8	10,4	7,2	9,6	4,9
Job Protection	36,1	30,0	41,7	43,5	41,0	24,9	34,2	44,8
No Opinion	6,2	10,0	8,3	10,7	4,7	5,6	4,1	6,7

Question 8: Which demand should be given preference in the order of priorities?

Total		AGE GROUP			
		18-24	25-44	45-59	60 & Over
Reduction of Working Hours	11,6	13,3	7,3	10,1	17,0
Protection of Purchasing Pr.	34,2	20,0	47,7	27,7	23,9
Working Conditions	2,5	13,3	2,8	-	3,4
Expression of Wage Earners	2,3	6,7	2,3	2,5	2,0
Right to Examine Mgmt.	7,1	6,7	6,8	9,2	6,2
Job Protection	36,1	40,0	27,5	43,7	40,3
No Opinion	6,2	-	5,6	6,8	7,2

The breakdown according to age groups shows that the youngest communists have felt the effects of the austerity program the least.

If communist farmers, liberal professions and higher management feel, in appreciable proportions (although still a minority), that the results of 10 May 1981 have not always negatively affected incomes, 78.6 percent of employees, on the other hand, see things differently. Considering the specific importance of this category to the PC, the increasing information in this area cannot fail to catch the attention of PCF headquarters:

Question 11: Since 10 May 1981, has your purchasing power:

Risen	6.4%
Neither risen nor fallen	21.7%
Fallen	68.8%
No Opinion	3.1%

	Total	AGE GROUP			
		18-24	25-44	45-59	60 & Over
Risen	6,4	13,3	5,6	3,8	9,1
Neither risen nor fallen	21,7	13,3	16,9	18,9	29,5
Fallen	68,8	60,0	75,0	74,8	58,0
No Opinion	3,1	13,4	2,5	2,5	3,4

Question 11: Since 10 May 1981, has your purchasing power:

	Total	CSP						
		AG	PIC	PL.CS	CM	E et al	OPS	INC
Risen	6,4	40,0	-	12,0	1,5	3,8	2,7	9,1
Neither risen nor fallen	21,7	10,0	33,3	21,7	20,1	16,5	19,2	28,4
Fallen	68,8	50,0	50,0	62,0	76,1	78,6	74,0	58,5
No Opinion	3,1	-	16,7	4,3	2,3	1,1	4,1	4,0

Reorganizations, Delors Plan: A Disconcerted PC

Question 4: In general, do you think that the government has no choice and that it accepts layoffs in order to avert more serious crises?

	Total	AGE GROUP			
		18-24	25-44	45-59	60 & Over
Yes	37,9	40,0	34,8	39,9	40,1
No	41,4	60,0	32,8	47,1	46,0
No Opinion	20,7	-	32,4	13,0	13,9

	Total	CSP						
		AG	PIC	PL.CS	CM	E et al	OPS	INC
Yes	37,9	50,0	58,3	51,1	41,8	30,1	38,4	40,2
No	41,4	50,0	41,7	41,3	50,7	31,6	45,2	45,7
No Opinion	20,7	-	-	7,6	7,5	38,3	16,4	14,1

Question 5: In sectors such as automobile manufacturing, a refund bonus for immigrant workers has been proposed. Are you in favor of such a proposal?

	Total	AGE GROUP			
		18-24	25-44	45-59	60 & Over
Yes	56,4	60,0	36,6	66,8	71,3
No	26,8	22,2	24,8	31,6	22,2
No Opinion	16,8	17,8	38,6	1,6	6,5

	Total	CSP						
		AG	PIC	PL.CS	CM	E et al	OPS	INC
Yes	56,4	60,0	58,3	59,8	61,2	42,0	43,8	70,7
No	26,8	40,0	41,7	28,2	27,6	24,6	50,7	21,6
No Opinion	16,8	-	-	12,0	11,2	33,4	5,5	7,7

If PC members answered the question on purchasing power in unison, despite some fragmentation, they are divided on certain problems. Faced with layoffs, communists are not as categorical as their general secretary in rejecting layoffs as a united group.

Question 4: In general, do you think that the government has no choice and that it accepts layoffs in order to avert more serious crises?

Yes	37.9%
No	41.4%
No Opinion	20.7%

Question 5: In sectors such as automobile manufacturing, a refund bonus for immigrant workers has been proposed. Are you in favor of such a proposal?

Yes	56.4%
No	26.8%
No Opinion	16.8%

Question 6: Should the government make an appeal for national solidarity to protect threatened industrial sectors?

Yes	63.3%
No	29.9%
No Opinion	6.8%

There were almost as many yes as no answers and one out of five communists expressed no opinion. In fact, if the PC leadership were dealing with a government sure of itself, it would have a hard time challenging it with 58.6 percent of its members unconvinced by its arguments.... In the 25-44 age group, there was even a majority of yes answers:

Middle management appears most opposed to current layoffs, while employees seem least receptive to the party's policy in this regard.

Concerning a related aspect of the industrial situation, the future of immigrant wage earners, the majority of communists, following Georges Marchais on this issue, are not hostile to the principle of a refund bonus (see above).

Differences of opinion on this issue among communists is related to age (the 18-24 and 25-44 age groups are not on the same wavelength) and professional categories (in which workers and employees diverge).

Faced with a choice of appealing to taxpayers on behalf of "distressed sectors," the large majority of communists said they favored this solution. However, a solid one-third of "dissenters" emerges in this case as well, with 36.7 percent rejecting it or dodging an answer.

The 18-24 age group is the most receptive to "national solidarity," the majority of farmers are hostile to it and only communist employers approve of it en masse (it would still be necessary to know their conception of "national solidarity").

Question 6: Should the government make an appeal for national solidarity to protect threatened industrial sectors?

	Total	CSP						
		AG	PIC	PLCS	CM	E et al	OPS	INC
Yes	63,3	40,0	83,3	56,5	60,4	69,3	64,4	59,8
No	29,9	60,0	16,7	33,7	29,9	26,7	30,1	32,0
No Opinion	6,8	-	-	9,8	9,7	4,0	5,5	8,2

A Party Divided on the Delors Plan

One of the major surprises of this poll concerns the opinion of PC members on the Delors Plan. Their general secretary does not believe in it, as he told Channel 2 on 2 April: Inflation for 1984 will not be held down to 5 percent.

A few days earlier, a large majority of party members held the opposite opinion or expressed no opinion.

Question 12: Do you believe in the success of the Delors Plan (5 percent inflation for 1984)?

Yes	23.8%
No	55.9%
No Opinion	20.3%

	Total	AGE GROUP			
		18-24	25-44	45-59	60 & Over
Yes	23,8	26,7	13,1	22,7	31,6
No	55,9	66,7	57,8	66,0	46,9
No Opinion	20,3	6,6	29,1	11,3	21,5

	Total	CSP						
		AG	PIC	PL, CS	CM	E et al	O, PS	ING
Yes	23,8	40,0	16,7	20,7	15,7	18,3	28,8	32,3
No	55,9	40,0	75,0	67,4	79,1	48,4	58,9	50,0
No Opinion	20,3	20,0	8,3	11,9	5,2	33,3	12,3	17,7

Question 13: Do you find this plan in accord with the promises made by candidate Mitterrand when he campaigned for the Office of President of the Republic?

	Total	AGE GROUP			
		18-24	25-44	45-59	60 & Over
Yes	26,5	40,0	16,2	24,8	38,1
No	52,1	46,7	51,0	61,8	47,7
No Opinion	21,4	13,3	32,8	13,4	14,2

Question 13: Do you find this plan in accord with the promises made by candidate Mitterrand when he campaigned for the Office of President of the Republic?

	Total	CSP						
		AG	PIC	PL, CS	CM	E et al	O, PS	INC
Yes	26,5	30,0	33,3	23,9	24,6	20,9	20,5	33,8
No	52,1	60,0	66,7	65,2	63,4	41,2	65,8	52,4
No Opinion	21,4	10,0	-	10,9	12,0	37,9	13,7	13,8

Yes 26.5%
 No 52.1%
 No Opinion 21.4%

The number of "believers" is smallest in the 25-44 age group, in which skeptics total 86.9 percent. Whereas 79.1 percent of communist higher management are convinced of failure, only 48.4 percent of employees think as they do. The doubts of communists increase when the question is extended to the political sphere: the number of those not reacting negatively rises from 44.1 to 47.9 percent.

We find notable gaps between age groups and employees are less reserved than other communists toward the administration.

Georges Marchais has told Channel 2 more than once that communists are not satisfied with being critics; "We propose our solutions and they are applicable." Is his flock convinced of this? At first glance, yes.

Question 14: Do you think that the new economic policy proposed by the PC is applicable to our country?

Yes 63.7%
 No 26.4%
 No Opinion 9.9%

	Total	AGE GROUP			
		18-24	25-44	45-59	60 & Over
Yes	63,7	46,7	48,5	71,0	77,3
No	26,4	40,0	42,4	17,6	13,6
No Opinion	9,9	13,3	9,1	11,4	9,1

But a solid one-third of dissenters emerges once again: 36.3 percent skeptics or cautious PC members. One out of three communists does not accept deep down inside the PCF's policy on a problem that is decisive for its credibility. The older communists are, the more they believe in the party's directives and solutions; moreover, 39.4 percent of employees do not approve of the PC's economic policy, plus 8.1 percent of them who "don't know": a total of 47.5 percent. But the role of this category, if it changes, may prove decisive for the experimental attempts to carry out Philippe Herzog's proposals in businesses.

Question 14: Do you think that the new economic policy proposed by the PC is applicable to our country?

	Total	CSP						
		AG	PIC	PL, CS	CM	E et al	O, PS	INC
Yes	63,7	50,0	33,3	59,8	65,7	52,5	71,2	76,5
No	26,4	40,0	50,0	31,5	20,1	39,4	17,8	14,6
No Opinion	9,9	10,0	16,7	8,7	14,2	8,1	11,0	8,9

Communists, Their Party and Other Parties

Among the poll's sociological information, we find that 81.1 percent of communists usually read a national daily newspaper and that 73.3 percent of these militants-readers prefer the PC's main organ, L'HUMANITE. The 16.7 percent of communists who believe they can do without the guide made available to them by Roland Leroy turn to LE MONDE. This fact shows how justified is the vigilance with which the PC scours and, when necessary, censures LE MONDE. Other daily newspapers received negligible percentages.

Armed with L'HUMANITE ... or LE MONDE, communists have a basis on which to formulate a judgment on political problems. This is an ordinary question put to noncommunists and one that is often thought to cause waves within the PC.

Question 3: Are you in favor, opposed or indifferent to the participation of communist ministers in the government?

In Favor	76.4%
Opposed	6.4%
Indifferent	14.5%
No Opinion	

Here we note one of the highest rates of approval of the PCF leadership's position by its members: 76.4 percent, more than three-fourths of those polled. This time there is no solid one-third, but nevertheless 23.6 percent of communists who are not unquestioning supporters of the communist ministers' participation in the government. However, the communist leadership can boast in this instance of a very broad consensus, although it has the drawback of requiring a long "campaign of explanation" if it became necessary to change policy.

Until that day, which the PC considers unlikely (at least on its own initiative), we can think about the next ministerial reshuffling. Among socialist "prime minister" candidates, who is favored by communists?

Question 4: There has been a great deal of talk about a ministerial reshuffling. Among those individuals usually mentioned, which one in your opinion would be the most capable prime minister?

Pierre Mauroy	34 %
Louis Mermaz	7 %
Pierre Beregovoy	2 %
Jacques Delors	7.6%
Michel Rocard	8.6%
Laurent Fabius	3.3%
No Opinion	37.5%

The fact that Pierre Mauroy is "the" prime minister of communists is not very surprising. The fact that Michel Rocard, among others, a "social democrat" par excellence in the eyes of the PC, ranks second, even with 8.6 percent, is more surprising. Once again, the fumes of the "dominant ideology" penetrate even the ranks of the "worker vanguard."

Moving from possible prime ministers to political figures in general, the lack of the PC's impermeability to outside influences is confirmed; however, the stereotypes which it circulates nevertheless have a certain influence within its ranks and the scores obtained by Jacques Chirac are exemplary from this standpoint. But the most important conclusion of the "review of chiefs" shown below lies in the ratings respectively obtained by three communist leaders: Charles Fiterman, minister of transportation; Andre Lajoinie, chairman of the PC parliamentary group in the National Assembly; and Georges Marchais, PCF general secretary. With 21.8 percent of "very good" opinions, the official chief only ranks third on this level, far behind his minister comrade, with 39.6 percent. Georges Marchais is still a recognized leader, of course, since he received a total 83.2 percent favorable opinions: but he cannot be considered a charismatic and irrefutable leader. Another fact worth noting: Jean-Pierre Chevenement's 38.3 percent of good opinions and Michel Rocard's 23.1 percent.

If the panel of "chiefs" is limited only to leaders of groups, we find that the Coalition of the Left exerts an amazing attraction for PC members and that 25.8 percent of them do not identify with Georges Marchais.

Question 5: Do you have a very good, good, average, poor, or very poor opinion of each of the following individuals?

	<u>V. Good</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Avg.</u>	<u>Poor</u>	<u>V. Poor</u>	<u>NOP</u>
- Michel Rocard	4,5	23,1	44,1	15,1	2,6	10,7
- J.-P. Chevènement	3,2	38,3	28,7	15,2	0,9	13,7
- Simone Veil	1,3	7,9	11,3	37,1	33,4	9
- V. Giscard-d'Estaing	0,7	3,4	16,7	27	44	8,2
- R. Barre	0,8	5,2	7,9	34,5	43,8	7,8
- J. Chirac	1,2	3,6	5,2	29,8	51,2	9
- G. Marchais	21,8	38,9	22,5	5,1	4,8	6,9
- A. Lajoinie	25,1	35,9	9,5	13,1	1,3	15,1
- C. Fiterman	39,6	31,7	5,6	13,2	2,6	7,3

Question 6: In your opinion, since May 1981 have the following political families gained, remained stable or lost ground with the public in general?

	<u>Gained</u>	<u>Stable</u>	<u>Lost</u>	<u>NOP</u>
- Far Right	70,1	18,3	3,2	8,4
- RPR	41,1	42,4	4,4	12,1
- Centrists	8,1	48,8	20,1	23
- Socialists	4	25,2	62,1	8,7
- Communists	13,9	32,8	44,6	8,7
- Far Left	2,9	27,8	43,7	25,6

Question 7: Do you have a very good, good, average, poor, or very poor opinion of each of the following individuals?

	<u>V. Good</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Avg.</u>	<u>Poor</u>	<u>V. Poor</u>	<u>NOP</u>
- J.-M. Le Pen	0,2	1,3	3,3	8,9	69,1	17,2
- J. Chirac	0,7	3,4	6,3	26,5	46,8	16,3
- J. Lecanuet	-	1,6	8,2	30,5	42,2	17,5
- L. Jospin	2,3	39,1	33,5	4,5	1,7	18,9
- G. Marchais	25,7	36,8	11,7	4,3	4,1	17,4

A leader accepted unenthusiastically, a party both inside and outside the government, a position that is easy to justify dialectically but difficult to uphold factually: communists sense the ambiguity of their situation and clearly express it. Only 13.9 percent of them believe they are making progress, while 44.6 percent feel they are regressing.

Belonging to the PC and supporting it is one thing: that means that someone is roughly in agreement with the PC's expressed image of itself. Once inside the party, even after a long time, is a member totally satisfied? And how are other parties perceived, in terms of their "social" role, by communists? The answers qualify the opinions expressed on leaders. The public image of the PS is not disastrous; one-third (34 percent) of communists do not feel that the PC is necessarily equal to the situation.

When the same question was asked regarding parties/militants correspondence, the mood of the PC's "dissenting third" is confirmed, since 35.1 percent do not consider their own party to be the best vehicle.

A leadership that is truly recognized by a party's members is proof of success and vitality. The PC obviously has a serious problem in this regard, a problem that probably does not only concern the party's high leadership. Considering the substantial percentage of people over the age of 60 among the communists polled (a group little disposed to changing leaders), it is possible even to speak of a real crisis concerning the body of leaders in that party. Of course, it is possible that some of those polled were thinking of themselves, of their own status, for the desired renewal and that they understood the question as an alternation in the exercise of responsibilities and that the PC's regularly made appeal for the "rise of cadres" has found a response in this instance. Nevertheless, the established leaderships are the direct or indirect targets in this case.

Question 8: Do you think that the following political parties correctly express the present concerns of the French people?

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>NOP</u>
PS	37.1%	50 %	12.9%
PC	69.3	21.1	9.6
RPR	16.7	67.5	15.8
UDF	15.9	69.8	16.3

Question 9: Do you think that the following political parties correctly express the concerns of their members?

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>NOP</u>
PS	41.3%	31 %	27.7%
PC	64.9	14.7	20.4
RPR	43.9	19.4	36.7
UDF	40.9	20.5	38.6

Question 10: Are you in favor of changing political leaders within parties?

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>NOP</u>
PS	38.7%	27.3%	34 %
PC	42.4	28.2	29.4
RPR	33.5	21.2	45.3
UDF	32.6	21.1	46.3

European Parliament Elections

With regard to the European Parliament elections of 17 June 1984, the communists display a very sharp realism in contrast to the euphoric resolve exhibited by their national leaders. Of those polled, 67.8 percent do not believe that the total number of PC and PS votes will be higher than what the UDF-RPR opposition will receive. But this does not mean that the communists will not campaign with their well-known systematic fury and high-spiritedness.

The Le Pen phenomenon, a large unknown factor in the European Parliament elections, is causing major worries within the PC, although three-fourths of its members do not think that the National Front will get more than 5 percent of the vote.

Question 1: Will the Socialist Party and the Communist Party, in your opinion, score higher than the UDF-RPR opposition in the European Parliament elections to be held in June?

Yes	32.2%
No	29.7%
No Opinion	38.1%

Question 2: Do you believe that the far right will get more than 5 percent of the vote in the European Parliament elections?

Yes	26.4%
No	57.6%
No Opinion	16 %

Concerning the double-edged question of political consequences for French politics as a result of the European Parliament elections, communists are far from thinking in unison, although a high percentage of them are tempted to link this election to PC/PS relations.

Question 3: For the most part, do you think that if these elections reveal a change in the ratio of strength between the PS and PC, the president of the republic will have to take this into account?

Yes	48.1%
No	31.5%
No Opinion	20.4%

Question 4: If the PC scores higher than it did in the 1981 parliamentary elections, do you believe that communist participation in the government should be increased?

Yes	49.5%
No	40.7%
No Opinion	9.8%

Related specifically to government participation, the question brings out two contradictory opinions, actually of equal significance, within the PC.

On the other hand, a clear majority emerges in favor of the continuation, even under greater conditions of inferiority, of participation in the government. However, we should note the existence of a third (34.5 percent) of dissenting or undecided members.

Question 5: If the PC scores lower than it did in the 1981 parliamentary elections, do you believe that communist participation in the government should be reduced?

Yes	12.9%
No	65.5%
No Opinion	21.6%

Consensus on Foreign Policy

On several points, communists reacted with the homogeneity with which their party is credited by outsiders. Such homogeneity is never total, however. The example of Yves Montand, held in contempt by the party's press for years and constantly denounced in letters from L'HUMANITE's readers, is proof of this.

Question 1: Yves Montand has stated that he is neither a leftist nor a rightist, but do you think that his television speeches favor:

The Right	73.6%
The Government	1.3%
The Left	2.8%
No Opinion	22.3%

In the case of foreign policy, communists exhibit a unanimity that is at least impressive, if not total. In the event of a protracted test of strength abroad, if the PC were to abandon the restraint of expression it has adopted concerning Chad and Lebanon, the chief of state would run into massive opposition. Of course, once again, one out of five communists would remain passive.

Question 2: Are you in favor of the presence of French troops abroad (as in Africa)?

Yes	16.7%
No	74.4%
No Opinion	8.9%

The general opinion of PC members on current foreign policy would appear to be highly divided. Actually, the attitude of communists is in this instance a faithful reflection of the intentionally vague positions of their leadership regarding the judgment to be made of the administration's practices. In the event of a sudden crisis, there would undoubtedly be a period of indecision within the party before its militants would see their way "clear."

Question 3: Do you consider the government's foreign policy to be a policy of national independence toward the two blocs?

Yes	41.1%
No	50.3%
No Opinion	8.6%

More specific information was requested of the 50 percent who expressed a negative opinion of the government's foreign policy. The result is not surprising. Francois Mitterrand's visit to the United States was not something that was likely to reassure communists. The PC/PS dispute has a "foreign policy" aspect which observers, with their attention fixed on social problems, have tended to overlook in recent months. On the other hand, it seems that the administration is aware of this.

Question 4: Only for those who answered no to question 3. If no, is it:

Closer to the United States?	69.3%
Closer to the Soviet Union?	1.7%
No Opinion	29.0%

Conclusion

All of the data produced by a poll of this scope could not be transcribed in this issue. The sociology of the PC will probably owe a lot to this study, in any case much more than to the occasional and sometimes inaccurate studies which the PC has published (as in 1966 and 1979) on its members.

A general commentary could not describe the wealth of information obtained by this survey. A general conclusion should, however, be drawn from it. The PC proclaims that the "monolithic" description of it provides a false picture of its actual situation. The poll apparently bears out the PC's protest, in the sense that communists appear divided and often undecided on important issues. Actually, the party's leadership, which is aware of the indecision of its members and minor officials, is struggling to make the best of a bad situation. Aware of the problems in getting its key ideas accepted, some of which are very contradictory, it exploits its failures in internal communication by transforming them into proof of democratic operation and respect for its members and their consciences. What should be concluded from this poll is the PC's vulnerability to a firm position regarding its demands and its slow, methodical and inexorable advances. Its Achilles Heel lies in its members, whom the party machinery, despite its perfection, has not been able to turn into complete robots. The PCF still lacks the military and police apparatus to control its members totally and, thereafter, all of society. What will it be in 10 years from now? It is obviously hard to say. Meanwhile, we have ample time to take advantage of the "subtle differences" within the PC in order to contain it and help it to decline.

TENDENCIES, PERSONALITIES SURFACE IN PASOK CONGRESS

Executive Bureau's Partisan Character

Athens 1 KATHIMERINI in Greek 17 May 84 p 1

/Text/ Last evening Premier A. Papandreou promoted to the Executive Bureau the genuine party hardliners during the election of the Central Committee which is PASOK's highest organ. The premier proposed the increase of the members to 10 and suggested the /added/ positions be taken by Simitis, D. Rokos and Vaso Papandreou because they come from the party.

At the same time, Papandreou, by keeping the old seven members, and especially I. Alevras and I. Kharalambopoulos, tried a timid opening to its moderate wing. Deputies of the majority party saw this also as an effort to preserve the balance within the party after the overly leftist tone of the debates in the Congress.

The Voting

During the voting late the previous night the 10 members of the Executive Bureau received the following number of votes: P. Avgerinos and I. Kharalambopoulos (134 each), K. Simitis (133), D. Rokos (132), I. Alevras and K. Laliotis (130), P. Moralis (129), A. Tsokatzopoulos (128), G. Gennimatas (123), and Vaso Papandreou (112).

With the selection of Simitis, A. Papandreou is trying to restore his ties to the party cadres who had been displeased by /Simitis'/ removal in 1979--very "rudely"--when Simitis learned about his dismissal from the newspapers.

The selection of Rokos and Vaso Papandreou also represents a victory of the party stalwarts except that these two express different tendencies within PASOK. Both are known for their extreme Third World views and their extreme aggressiveness against the centrist and democratic leftists, something which does not characterize Simitis.

The candidacies of Melina Merkouri and deputy An. Intzes, who were not proposed by A. Papandreou for election to the Executive Bureau, are regarded as insubordination to the leader.

The premier explained that he proposes only 10 with 3 alternates (Mrs.) Tzoumaka, Skandalidis, and Daskalakis. He asked those who wanted to do so to nominate themselves, and not to be nominated by others. (Eventually Merkouri received 22 votes and Intzes 17.)

The exclusion of Koutsogiorgas is attributed to the issue concerning his possible removal from his post as deputy.

The exclusion of Arsenis is attributed to the fact that he is disliked by many because he does not come from the party organizations.

Personalities Ranked in Importance

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 18-24 May 84 pp 52-53

/Text/ The First Congress of PASOK did not go too badly for A. Papandreou as he anticipated. But it also left problems, surprises and dilemmas for him since the 2,500 delegates displayed on occasion a behavior which surprised in one or the other direction. How did the situation develop which led to Papandreou's new Executive Bureau? Let us take things in sequence:

The long introductory speech by Papandreou had one central goal: Couched in a leftist phraseology, it was designed to forestall the leftist criticism of many delegates, which was of concern. Behind the scenes, associates of the premier, who gave assurances that there would be no "mutinies", knew that a single spark could start a fire.

Papandreou wrote his speech artfully. When he finished the leftist delegates had little about which to complain. He had found a way to connect the present with the strings of the 1974 Declaration. The Marxism of PASOK's adolescence (1974-77) returned to the foreground to the extent needed by Papandreou and his "revisionist" associates.

(Washington reacted strongly against Papandreou's remarks about the United States, but the PASOK chairman is not worried. He simply gave instructions to give the Americans the appropriate "explanations". The needs of the First Congress had their cost "on the right.")

But if Papandreou was able to overcome one big obstacle on Saturday he was unable to overcome another: the great majority of delegates had come to the Congress determined to "strike" at what is known as the premier's "circle" and the "group" around Margaret Papandreou which is active in the Greek Women's Union /EGE/.

In spite of the fact that young G. Papandreou, with cleverly couched (leftist) views, improved somewhat the climate for the Papandreou family, the delegates did not change their intentions. When the time came to vote for the Central Committee, they started to strike at "their targets." P. Aygerinos and K. Simitis were elected at the top, first and second. Two cadres with "a

record." The first was expected to be cut off from the Executive Bureau. The second was the last one Papandreou wanted to see as one of the "victors" of the Congress.

The third position was taken by K. Laliotis who won only 74 votes over Ant. Tritsi (who came in fourth) who was cut off on the basis of the Papandreou proposals and who was a big surprise and proved that his city planning and other visions have impressed the PASOK rank and file.

G. Gennimatas came in fifth, although he is losing ground in the group of the "successors". At one point Papandreou called him "Mister Gennimatas" and many "comrades" felt a chill... And after him, sixth, one of the "mistreated" in the "reshufflings", the party activist D. Rokos. Seventh, the quiet and tieless (in the Papandreou circle) P. Moralis; eighth, the member of the "troika", Akis Tsokhatzopoulos (he is also losing ground); and ninth, the recently mistreated Giannis Pottakis, the representative of the Marxist wing. Tenth, the much-talked about D. Sotirlis. In other words, a "top 10" which Papandreou did not like. He saw Vaso Papandreou down in 17th position, although for many months she was the "chosen" of the leader. In 11th position /he saw/ his son George and "heretics" like the Marxist Kharalambidis high--25th--ahead of many other select and faithful such as Karolos Papoulias, G. Skoularikis, Melina Merkouri, and many others.

The Chairman's Men

The "Chairman's men" such as Ant. Stratis and G. Katsifaras were found at the bottom of the list, while Papandreou had every reason to be upset at the election of Sot. Kostopoulos although instructions had been given for his exclusion.

Let us take a look at certain interesting cases which were much discussed at the PASOK Congress.

Vaso Papandreou: For a long time she was a participant in the most intimate summit meetings in the government and in PASOK and her "rise" impressed many. But at the Congress, Vaso Papandreou had a hard time, causing many negative comments. She caused a storm, for example, with her proposal to take disciplinary action against delegates who voiced open disagreement. It is believed that her arrogant and autocratic behavior as a member of the Presidium of the Congress put her in 17th place in the Central Committee. Nevertheless, Andreas Papandreou "put" Vaso Papandreou in the Executive Bureau, ignoring the "impressions" of the Congress.

Ger. Arsenis: He was a candidate for the Central Committee. He did very well (elected 13th) but the climate was cold for him in the Congress. The PASOK rank and file consider his economic policy rightist. Those who spoke at the Congress criticizing Arsenis' economic policy either directly or indirectly received a hearty applause. Behind the scenes it is agreed that this bad climate eventually led A. Papandreou to "cut" Arsenis out of the

Executive Bureau.

K. Simitis: His election in second place in the Central Committee is considered as the "great vindication" of the minister of agriculture who a few years ago was the black sheep in the PASOK leadership because of his "heretical" views on the EEC question. A. Papandreou could not keep him out of the Executive Bureau any longer, even though the members of the troika may feel embarrassed since they advocated his "removal".

D. Rokos: His election to the Executive Bureau was considered as a surprise. Rokos, the "leftist" and a friend of the party activists, who was in the dog house a few years ago, was favored in part because of A. Papandreou's desire to satisfy a variety of disaffected members in the left wing and to give the impression of renewing the Executive Bureau.

Ant. Tritsis: He appeared unexpectedly popular in front of the 2,500 PASOK delegates. He was strengthened by the fact that Vaso Papandreou managed to get in a quarrel with him, interrupting his speech in a way many considered inconsiderate. His election to the fourth spot in the Executive Bureau was certainly a surprise in spite of the fact that he was not among the deputies proposed by the premier.

Men. Koutsogiorgas: In spite of the fact that rumors held that he was "popular" among the PASOK rank and file--at least in the provinces--he passed almost unnoticed at the Congress. He was elected to 19th place in the Central Committee and the premier did not dare put him in the Executive Bureau. (A month ago Koutsogiorgas was considered "in" for such a post.)

It is noteworthy that the PASOK delegates gave a very warm reception to the protagonist of the PYRKAL /expansion unknown/ Affair, Sotirlis (to the great joy of his "team leader" Akis Tsokhatzopoulos). Sotirlis received applause with his fist raised in salute(?) and was elected 10th in the Central Committee.

It must be noted that another person much talked about on the eve of the Congress as a basic candidate for the Executive Bureau was the self-effacing Karolos Papoulias. He was elected 28th in the Central Committee and A. Papandreou decided in the end to keep him out of the present necessary balances in the Executive Bureau.

Papandreou also decided to leave out of the balances of the Executive Bureau Giannis Skoularikis, also a "favorite candidate" some time ago.

Another basic PASOK cadre, Giannis Alevras, quietly sat through the 3-day Congress. He was elected only 23rd in the Central Committee but reports say he was not particularly annoyed. Alevras, they say, is convinced he should not seek high government or party positions. A. Papandreou already considers him as the number one candidate for president of the Republic, later.

Conclusion: This was a Congress which in the end did not cost much politically to A. Papandreou. The "sacrifices" to the Left were many but this is not expected to have serious effects on the electorate. There was also the presence of G. Mavros at the Congress--in an effort to "honor" the centrist supporters of PASOK. Few were convinced, many were annoyed, but Mavros was pleased, and he forgot that the organizers of the Congress had initially forgotten to invite him! (But it was also necessary to have a lunch at Papandreou's home in Kastri to placate the veteran of the Center.)

The "absurdity" of the Congress is that at the very time PASOK is desperately trying to convince the Centrist voters, the 2,500 delegates vied to prove their leftist purity.

Who's Who in PASOK

Article TO VIMA in Greek 20 May 84 p 4

(Article by Mikh. Dimitriou)

(Text) In the new PASOK Central Committee lawyers represent the largest number of professionals, followed by economists, physicians and civil engineers.

Specifically, 31 members of the committee are lawyers while K. Simitis is a professor of commercial law. Vas. Kafiris has also studied law while Karolos Papoulias is a Doctor of Law (but not a lawyer).

The most prominent of the 19 economists who are members of the Central Committee are Professor and PASOK Chairman Andreas Papandreou. Vas. Kafiris, Ger. Arsenis, Vaso Papandreou, Th. Katsanevas, Al. Mitropoulos, and others hold university degrees.

Among the 16 scientists of the committee (Prof. Dim. Rokos included), 10 are civil engineers: Amalos, Geitonas, Gennimatas, Ziangas, Kotsakas, Laskarakis, Birdimiris, Sakelaris, Souladakis and Tsikhatzopoulos. Of the 10 physicians, Nikos Vgenopoulos holds a Ph.D. also.

Ten members are students in institutions of higher learning, four are philologists (Moralis, Arsenis, Roussios, and Khatzinakis), five are dentists, two are retired Army men, while Melina Merkouri is a unique representative of the whole spectrum of the cultural sector.

Fifty two members of the previous Central Committee were re-elected, while the following 14 failed to be elected or were runner ups: Myriakou, Kyratsous, Zakharopoulos, Mortzos, Nikainas, Nikolaidis, Otzounidis, Papadakis, Pavlidis, Politopoulos--who was elected president of the Disciplinary Committee--Rallis, Sakellaris, Serafeimidis, and Khras.

(Translator's note: Figures in parentheses represent individual's ranking in terms of votes received in the election of the Central Committee members.

Expansions of acronyms are given at the end of the article. The members of the Central Committee are:

1. Andreas Papandreou, 65, university professor, chairman of the Executive Office /EG/, premier.
2. Athan. Athanasoulis (33), 28, KATEE 1/ graduate, Ministry of Education counsellor.
3. Sylva Akrita (109), 56, former social worker, deputy, Second Athens District.
4. Nik. Akritidis (94), 48, physicist-mathematician, topographer, deputy, First Salonica District, minister of communications.
5. Stathis Alexandris (95), 63, lawyer, deputy, First Athens District.
6. Giannis Alevras (23), 69, retired banker, deputy, First Athens District, president of the Chamber of Deputies.
7. Tasos Amalos (132), 49, civil engineer, EAS 2/ president.
8. Maria Arseni (68), 40, philologist, nomarch of Pieria.
9. Gerasimos Arsenis (13), 53, economist, minister of national economy and finance.
10. Par. Avgerinos (1), surgeon, EG member, minister without portfolio.
11. Giannis Vainas (101), 40, topographer, Agrinion vice-mayor, Aitolokarnania organizations.
12. Sifis Valyrakis (30), 43, graduate of the Savitaneidios School, Khania deputy, deputy minister of communications.
13. Nikos Vgenopoulos (89), 58, cardiologist, Eurodeputy.
14. Dim. Vounatsos (139), 41, lawyer, Lesvos deputy.
15. Dim. Gaitanidis (135), 45, laborer, syndicalist, Committee of Farmers' Cooperatives.
16. Kon. Geitonas (39), 43, civil engineer, YDE 3/ secretary general.
17. Georg. Gennimatas (5), 45, civil engineer, deputy-at-large, EG member, minister of health.
18. Khar. Georgakis (125), 41, radiologist, Rethymni deputy.

19. Athan. Georgiades (48), physician, president of Veroia Municipal Council.
20. Evang. Giannopoulos (137), 66, lawyer, deputy, Second Piraeus District, minister of labor.
21. St. Giotas (11), 44, lawyer, deputy from Remainder Attiki, deputy minister of agriculture.
22. Men. Givalas (44), 35, civil engineer, EG member.
23. Athan. Golfopoulos (97), 60, retired chemist, Akhaia deputy.
24. Georg. Daskalakis (60), 48, insurance agent, syndicalist, Second Athens District deputy, EG member.
25. Man. Daskalakis (36), 36, chemist, special secretary in the Ministry of National Economy, alternate EG member.
26. And. Drosogiannis (73), 62, retired lt. general, national defense alternate minister.
27. Mikh. Doris (25), 49, architect, secretary of the Peace Committee.
28. Pav. Zakolikos (114), 48, lawyer, Magnesia deputy, deputy minister of national defense.
29. Lambros Zarras (117), 60, farmer, cooperativist, Larissa Cooperative.
30. Giannis Ziangas (106), 44, civil engineer, Eurodeputy.
31. Pan. Thermos (134), 35, Ministry of Interior employee, member of the Organizational Committee.
32. Georg. Thomas (113), 33, lawyer, assistant to M. Merkouri.
33. Anast. Intzes (86), 48, lawyer, economist, First Salonica District deputy.
34. Vas. Intzes (86), 58, electrical engineer, Serrai deputy, minister of Northern Greece.
35. Ap. Kaklamanis (18), lawyer, Second Athens District deputy, minister of education.
36. Sp. Kaloudis (84), 40, lawyer, Kerkyra deputy.
37. Theod. Kapetanakis (65), 41, private employee, member of the Peristeri Municipal Council.

38. Evgenia Karaveli (37), 37 economist, nomarch of Dodekanisos.
39. M. Karakonstandakis (105), 42, architect, Irakleion Organization.
40. Anna Karamanou (126), 35, OTE 4/ employee, member of the DEI 5/
Council.
41. Andonis Karras (49), 50, economist, member of the PYRKAL 6/
Council.
42. Khar. Kastanidis (53), 28, lawyer, First Salonica District deputy.
43. Theod. Katsanevas (62), 37, economist, OAED 7/ governor.
44. Georg. Kotsimbardis (45), 45, lawyer, Voiotia deputy, SEGAS 8/
president.
45. Georg. Katsifaras (115), 49 retired banker, First Athens District
deputy, minister of merchant marines.
46. Vas. Kafiris (81), 52, university professor, ATE 9/ governor.
47. Georg. Kissonas (124), 43, statistician, attached to the premier's
office.
48. Dim. Kitsioulis (75), 40, employee, syndicalist committee.
49. Khr. Kokkinovasilis (99), 35, laborer, syndicalist, syndicalist
committee.
50. And. Kotsakas (91), 35, engineer.
51. Kimon Koulouris (27), 44, economist, DEI employee, secretary
general of athletics.
52. Athan. Kourmatzis (80), 20, student, Industrial School, alternate
secretary of the Youth Committee.
53. Mika Koutsileou (88), 44, sociologist, teacher, member of the
Executive Secretariat.
54. Menios Koutsogiorgos (19), 62, lawyer, Akhaia deputy, minister of
the interior.
55. Maria Kypriotaki (58), gynecologist, Second Athens District
deputy, deputy minister of health.
56. Georg. Kyriopoulos (90), merchant, EVEA 10/ president.
57. Floros Konstandinou (77), 32, economist, Drama deputy.

58. Sot. Kostopoulos (102), 41, political commentator, Press Secretary General.

59. Konst. Laliotis (3), 32, graduate, Dental School, EG member.

60. Evang. Malesios (92), 38, economist, Ministry of National Economy.

61. Eirini Lambraki (31), 39, lawyer, Second Athens District deputy.

62. Petros Lambrou (64), 40, economist, EOMMEX 11/ director general.

63. Ioan. Laskarakis (104), 46, civil engineer, Alexandroupolis PASOK Organization.

64. Evang. Mamalakis (108), 50, merchant, Irakleion PASOK Organization.

65. Stef. Manikas (17), 31, dentist, Youth Committee secretary.

66. Tasos Mandelis (100), 39, lawyer, Kefallinia deputy.

67. Khr. Markopoulos (111), 56, Polytechnic School assistant professor, Eurodeputy.

68. Ir. Matrangas (121), 48, physician, Ileia deputy.

69. Dim. Mavrakis (48), 41, physicist, alternate secretary of the Self-Government Committee.

70. Mel. Merkouri, actress, Second Piraeus District deputy, minister of culture.

71. Al. Mitropoulos (71), 36, economist, special consultant, Ministry of Labor.

72. Nik. Mikhalopoulos (79), 39, lawyer, member of the EYDAP 12/ Administrative Council.

73. St. Bazianas (55), lawyer, president of the Farmers' Associations of Greece.

74. Georg. Birdimiris (140), civil engineer, AOEK 13/ governor.

75. Ger. Bristogiannis (57), 50, lawyer, secretary of cooperatives.

76. Georg. Moraitis (26), 42, lawyer, Ioannina deputy, deputy minister of agriculture.

77. Petros Moralis (7), 48, professor of philology, EG member, deputy minister of education.

78. Mikh. Neonakis (118), 28, Dental School graduate, member Organizational Committee.

79. Gian. Nikolaou (70), 26, graduate of the Pandeios School, alternate secretary of the Youth Committee.

80. Andr. Doutsos (127), 55, farmer, member, PASOK Organization in Kiverion of Argolis.

81. Georgios Zarlis (41), 35, private employee, member PASOK Organization in Germany.

82. Pand. Oikonomou (83), 34, mathematician, member Organizational Committee.

83. Theod. Pangalos (81), 46, economist, Remainder Attiki deputy, deputy foreign minister.

84. Gian. Papadakis (40), 39, syndicalist, GSEE 14/ councillor.

85. Kon. Paipoutlidis (123), 38, physician, general director of SPEKA 15/.

86. Dim. Palaiotheodoros (133), 34, economist, president of ELKEPA 16/.

87. Panagiotakopoulos (120), 38, economist, Mobilization Committee.

88. Vas. Papagiannis (98), 41, accountant, Imathia deputy, deputy minister of public works.

89. Ioan. Papadatos (46), 40, physician, KEMEDIA 17/.

90. Vasil. Papadionysiou (131), 53, lawyer, mayor of Galatsi.

91. A. Papathanasopoulos (71), chemical engineer, Ministry of Energy secretary general.

92. Milt. Papaioannou (42), 38, lawyer, Second Athens District deputy, Deputy minister of the interior.

93. K. Panagiotou (122), 44, lawyer, Ministry of Labor secretary general.

94. Vaso Papandreou (16), 37, economist, EG member, president of EOMMEX.

95. Georg. Papandreou (12), 32, economist, sociologist, Akhaiia deputy, Executive Secretariat member.

96. Gian. Papaspyrou (129), 62, economist, mayor of Pireaus.
97. Makis Papastavrou (119), 49, private employee, general secretary of Greeks Abroad.
98. Karolos Papoulias (28), 55, Doctor of Law, Ioannina deputy, alternate minister of foreign affairs.
99. Khristos Papoutsis (21), 31, Executive Secretariat member, secretary of the Organizational Committee.
100. Dim. Pipergias (35), DEI technician, GENOP-DEI 18/ president.
101. Ioannis Pottakis (9), lawyer, Korinthia deputy.
102. Vas. Periovolos (85), 67, civil engineer, syndicalist, EAS vice president.
103. Poan. Rambavilas (136), pathologist, Patrai PASOK Organization.
104. Sylvana Rapti (138), 25, economist, member of Athens Municipal Council.
105. Georg. Raftopoulos (96), bank employee, GSEE president.
106. Dim. Reoos (37), 32, dentist, Arkadia deputy.
107. Anast. Rizopoulos (112), 24, KATEE graduate, Salonica PASOK Organization.
108. Dim. Rokos (6), 43, university professor, Public Land Company president.
109. Alex. Rysios (63), 67, professor of philology, president of the Panhellenic Organization of Strugglers.
110. Lyk. Sakellaris (116), 38, civil engineer, Rhessalonika nomarch.
111. Dim. Sapountzis (103), 49, physician, Evvoia deputy, KO 19/ secretary general.
112. Kon. Simitis (2), professor of Pandeios School, EG member, minister of agriculture.
113. Kon. Siakaris (76), Ioannina University lecturer, Ioannina Nome Committee cadre.
114. Kon. Skandalidis (34), 31, Polytechnic School graduate, EG alternate member.

115. Gian. Skoularikis (38), 56, lawyer, Ileia deputy, minister of public order.

116. Khr. Smyrlis (69), 30, dentist, in charge of the Working Youth Office.

117. Gian. Souladakis (50), 44, politician, member of the Executive Secretariat, EYDAP director general.

118. Rov. Spyropoulos (67), 35, OTE engineer, GSEE organizational secretary.

119. Min. Stavrakakis (78), 36, economist, president of a national institution.

120. Andonis Stratis (87), 66, lawyer-economist, political advisor to the premier.

121. Kostas Sfingos (107), psychiatrist, secretary of ESEK 20/.

122. Dim. Sotirlis (10), chemical engineer, Executive Secretariat member.

123. Stef. Tzoumakas (20), 38, lawyer, Second Athens District deputy, EG alternate member.

124. Man. Trikoupis (74), 33, lawyer, Salonia PASOK Organization.

125. And. Tritsis (4), lawyer, Kefallinia deputy, minister of housing and planning.

126. Kostas Tsimas (130), 48, manager, director general of ELTA 21/.

127. Dom. Tsovolas (14), lawyer, Artà deputy, deputy minister of finance.

128. Athan. Tsouras (32), physician, Ministry of Interior secretary general.

129. A. Tsokhatzopoulos (8), 45, civil engineer, deputy-at-large, EG member, minister of public works.

130. Gian. Floros (47), 59, physician, Larisa deputy, deputy minister of health.

131. Andr. Fouras (59), lawyer, Piraeus nomarch.

132. Theod. Khalatsis (61), lawyer, Kozani nomarch.

133. M. Kharalambidis (24), 32, economist, consultant to the Center for Mediterranean Studies.

134. I. Kharalambopoulos (15), 65, retired officer, engineer, Second Athens District deputy, EG member, minister of foreign affairs.

135. Gian. Kharalambous (128), 44, lawyer, Second Athens District deputy.

136. Fotis Khatzimikhalis (82), 25, law school student, alternate secretary of the Youth Committee.

137. Man. Khatzinakis (29), 43, professor, Lasithion deputy.

138. Foivos Khatzis (54), 30, lawyer, PASOK Organization of France.

139. Gian. Khatzopoulos (56), 37, lawyer, director general of ODIE 22/, member of the Organizational Committee.

140. Lila Khristoridou (119), 45, lawyer, deputy-at-large.

Expansions:

1. KATEE - Higher Technical-Vocational Education Centers.
2. EAS - Urban Communications Enterprises.
3. YDE - Ministry of Public Works.
4. OTE - Greek Telecommunications Organization.
5. DEI - Public Power Corporation.
6. PYRKAL - Expansion unknown.
7. OAED - Labor Force Employment Organization.
8. SEGAS - Association of Greek Gymnasts and Athletic Clubs.
9. ATE - Agricultural Bank of Greece.
10. EVEA - Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
11. EOMMEX - Hellenic Organization of Medium- and Small-Size Enterprises and Handicrafts.
12. EYDAP - Capital Area Water Supply and Drainage Co.
13. AOEK - Autonomous Greek Tobacco Organization.
14. GSEE - Greek General Confederation of Labor.
15. SPEKA - Cooperative Supply and Commercial Union.
16. ELKEPA - Greek Productivity Center.
17. KEMEDIA - Athens Center for Translators and Interpreters.
18. GENOP - Expansion unknown.
19. KO - Parliamentary Group. Also Party Organization.
20. ESEK - Expansion unknown.
21. ELTA - Greek Posts.
22. ODIE - Expansion unknown.

New Executive Bureau Members

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 16 May 84 p 4

/Text/ These are biographical notes for the new members of the PASOK Executive Bureau--regular and alternate. (We leave out Simitis and Tzoumakas who are better known.)

Dim. Rokos: One of the founding members of PASOK, coming from the Democratic Defense. He was a member of the previous Central Committee. He served as secretary general of the Ministry of Education and contributed decisively to the drafting of the "framework law." Professor of the Salonica Polytechnical School. He was born in Giannena in 1941.

Vaso Papandreou: Chairman of the Hellenic Organization of Medium- and Small-Size Enterprises and Handicrafts /EOMMEX/, member of the PASOK Executive Secretariat prior to the Congress. She is a PASOK founding member. She was born in Valimitika, Aigiou where she graduated from high school. She was a student at the Superior School of Commercial and Economic Sciences and was a graduate student of economics in London where, during the dictatorship, she was a member of the Panhellenic Resistance Movement /PAK/.

Kostas Skandalidis: From among the "theoreticians" of PASOK (regular editorial writer for EXORMISIS) he is the youngest member of the Executive Bureau. He studied at the Athens Polytechnic School. He was a member of the previous Central Committee and served as a member of the Executive Secretariat and of the PASCK Enlightenment Committee.

Man. Daskalakis: A chemist, one of the PASOK founding members. He was chairman of the National Drug Control Laboratory until the enactment of the related law. After his removal, he remained unemployed for a year and a half until March 1984 when he was appointed special secretary for industry in the Ministry of National Economy. As a party activist he was occupied primarily with labor union affairs. He was born in 1948 in Voukolies, of Kania.

7520

CSO: 3521/254

DROSOGIANNIS REPORTEDLY LOSES POWERS OF NATO DECISIONS

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 7 Jun 84 p 2

[Text] According to sources in Mr Papandreou's entourage, the prime minister has divested deputy Minister of Defense Drosogiannis of the right to make decisions on important political and military decisions deriving from our relations with NATO.

The only possible exception is the matter of our participation in NATO maneuvers in the Aegean, in which, according to the policy adopted by previous governments, we do not take part if the island of Limnos is not included, or when, more generally, the country's sovereignty interests are concerned.

The reason for the prime minister's decision was the attitude of deputy Minister Drosogiannis in the issue of the emplacement of "Harpoon" missiles on Turkish soil within the NATO framework.

Mr Drosogiannis had ordered our delegation to exercise a veto in order to cancel the "Harpoon" missiles' emplacement. However, the U.S. ambassador then declared, and others agreed, that the decision would be made even if this would lead to the abolition of the principle of unanimity.

Mr Andrikos, technical advisor to the prime minister, who was a member of the delegation--and was expressing his dissatisfaction over this entanglement--reported on this issue to his superior, Mr Makhairitsas, diplomatic advisor to Mr Papandreou, who, in turn, brought the matter to the attention of the prime minister, noting the negative results that our isolation among the members would have for our country.

CSO: 3521/270

JUDGMENTS, SPECULATIONS ON MOTA AMARAL'S POLITICAL FUTURE

Errors in Calculation

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 26 May 84 p 2

[Excerpts] During a week in which television was the center of attention for various reasons, Mota Amaral made his "reappearance" through "Front Page"; he had been silent since the defeat of the social democrats at the Braga Congress.

The interview had its interesting moments and touched on some of the less well-known aspects of Mota Amaral as a person, such as, for example, his membership in Opus Dei 23 years ago. Intentionally or not, the emphasis he placed on this religious choice and on his identification with the principles of that work, discarding the idea of secrecy with irony, showed a lack of inhibitions which cannot be observed in other quarters.

The interview's organization and sequence was rather odd. First of all there was the government official from the Azores, jealous of the autonomy which he claims as a working man, familiar with the case studies concerning the life of that island group, never hesitating to justify decisions made in the regional context, even when they represent investments that are way out of proportion to the will of the people on a particular island.

Under this heading, Mota Amaral proved himself to be sure of himself and skillful, as if his main objective were not confined to the Azores but that it was rather to present himself to a public opinion on the continent as a strict, austere government official who is quite familiar with the mechanisms of administration. He rarely ever made any reference to the documents he had brought with him and he answered questions eagerly and in a well-reasoned fashion.

During the second part, the interview was concentrated above all on the politician, the founder of the PSD [Social Democratic Party], the opponent of Mota Pinto, the man who "would not risk putting his name" on the list of possible candidate for the office of president of the republic.

He was rather cautious and ambiguous on that score. He kept saying that he would never run against a candidate of his party and that, following the Braga Congress, the decision was up to Mota Pinto. He recommended a change in the election law, he admitted that he did not intend to pursue a systematic opposition within the party and he did not conceal his sympathy for a presidency-oriented development of the system.

But there was nothing substantially new in this "return" of Mota Amaral, not even if one wished to look at some indications that he would like, as soon as possible, to change the attitude of discretion which he adopted after the Congress.

On the contrary, Mota Amaral seems to believe rather philosophically that time will prove him right and that the party sooner or later will ask him to abandon the quiet atmosphere of the Azores and tackle some more ambitious missions. In the meantime he loses no opportunity to show that he is up to date and alert to developments.

One cannot accuse the Azorean leader of the sin of inconsistency, nor could one say that he is in any way letting up in his efforts.

But it must be admitted that, if that was the challenge to Mota Amaral and if that challenge were to be postponed for a longer period of time, he was inclined quickly to accept supporting functions and to become involved in demonstrations and activities which actually boil down to campaign preparations in the race for the presidency, regardless of the defeat at the Braga Congress.

It is possible that he misinterpreted his position in the party machinery and did not expect such a big defeat at Braga.

There are errors of calculation which sometimes cost a man his future.

Candidacy Seen Certain

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 23 May 84 p 3

[Text] A single and happy fellow, sure of himself and the support of the social democrats in the region he governs and of which he is the party leader, an autonomist regarding the Azores, liberator of the state as far as Portugal is concerned, yesterday, under the candid and smiling questioning of Margarida Marante, presented himself to the curious Portuguese public.

Neither the civilized attitude of Francisco Pinto Balsemao, nor the rather provincial behavior of Carlos Mota Pinto. With Joao Bosco da Mota Amaral we were sure that we were facing a public man who comes from far away and who knows where he is going. The interview was an episode in the national promotion of a politician who was not defeated at Braga in the end and who, an Azorean by birth and in spirit, feels the call to higher things.

He had ready answers to the questions put to him because they had been outlined to him in advance or because he quite naturally anticipated them; and the questions that had not been put to him with prior notice but which were indiscreet or almost impertinent--such as the question about chastity or his membership in Opus Dei--gave him an opportunity, although with some delay in his fluent speech, to present himself as a member of Opus Dei at the age of 23 and on the subject of his voluntary celibacy. And he answered without ambiguity, with clarity, and we might even say with courage.

During the first part of the "Front Page" interview, he supplied evidence as to his work as the man in charge of the Autonomos Region of the Azores. He furnished proof of his administrative ability. He did not seek escape in the rule of continental government officials, that is, self-satisfaction. For Joao Bosco, everything is certain (in the Azores), everything is running smoothly (in the Azores) and on the horizon (of the islands), hopes are turned into promises and promises become certainty.

On the other hand--and he did not exaggerate--what happens on the continent is a subject for severe criticism. Both in the life of the PSD and generally in public life. The remarks by Joao Bosco da Mota Amaral are well put together and coherent in terms of their theoretical parameters. Mota Amaral is not an improviser, neither is he superficial, nor is he hasty. He knows what he says, he knows where to say it and to whom to say it. Yesterday, invited by RTP [Portuguese Radio-Television System], he was perfectly aware that he had been offered a platform for addressing the country and he exploited that opportunity smartly.

He spoke in his capacity as the governor of the Azores. He spoke as an opponent of the Mota Pinto line at the Braga Congress. He spoke as a candidate for the presidency of the republic. He spoke as member of "Opus Dei."

In this last capacity it must be noted that the "Work" was never described to the Portuguese--to the Catholic Christians, to the Christians of the various churches, to the followers of the various religions, to the agnostics and the nonbelievers--with such clear words, with such an open attitude, with such a human (Portuguese) face as happened yesterday, through the efforts of the RTP interviewer and thanks to Joao Bosco da Mota Amaral. It is difficult to determine to what point this "collage" will help him in his political destiny.

the revival of the candidacy of the social democratic leader from the Azores, at the moment at which there are initial hesitations as to the candidacy of Mario Soares, is the reaffirmation of the intension of putting up an autonomous social-democratic candidacy; in the meantime the work on the candidacy of Diogo Freitas do Amaral has been started and this will create a new political pole. It seems that some "Eanism" could go to the current of the social democratic and Christian leader of the Azores.

Whether it was intentional, whether it was planned, or whether it was the result of pure chance or the confusion of an uncertain orientation, "Operação Mota Amaral" will have repercussions. If anything this will involve the inevitable comparison between the behavior in the chambers and the political approach of a Mota Amaral and a Mota Pinto--and that is enough for the social democrats. As regards the general opinion of the television audience, this comparison is extremely unfavorable to the politician from Funchal who, exiled in Lisbon, proves to be inept and unsure of himself. The reduction of the "PS [Socialist Party]-PSD summit," regarding the ministerial reshuffling, to a trivial meeting between socialists and social democratic leaders and, by the same token, a "combination" between the prime minister and the vice prime minister, was quite revealing of the way in which Mota Pinto is mistaken in his political calculations and to what point he made himself dependent on Mario Soares.

But let us get back to João Bosco. From his words we learn that he does not feel diminished by the "defeat" at Braga and that he is perfectly determined to pursue a political career which could even include two national (continental) targets: S. Bento (or Jones Teixeira) or Belem.

As far as the social democratic leader from the Azores is concerned--a man who is very close to the Catholic church and who is viewed kindly by the United States government--it is once again "Marcelista continuity" which clashes with the "heritage of April-November." Mota Amaral pictures himself as a defender of the democratic system but as "a reformer of the current political system." Yesterday he did not mute his criticisms, nor did he censor the points on which he disagrees. As for his criticism directed at a bureaucratized or partisanized state--he was right on some points. The slogan he listed --"taking the government out of society, taking the party out of the government"--understood in a democratic sense, in a sense of "deepening democracy," will trigger much agreement. Indeed, the partisanized state, bureaucratically stifled as it is, needs to be liberated, needs to be removed from party control, needs to be relieved of all red tape. Deconcentration and decentralization are steps in reform and democratization which must be taken very urgently.

The candidacy--for the "PSD party" for the national government, for the presidency of the republic--of Joao Bosco da Mota Amaral has now been presented. There is no doubt that his message is different from that of Mota Pinto but it is also different from the political essence of April. Democracy--and its further profound development--calls for a clear and unequivocal rejection of "restorationism." The "revisionist" proposals (regarding the Constitution) coincided with the "restorationist" proposals regarding the "State," "civilian society," and the "social-economic structure."

The leader from the Azores speaks a clear language but he has his secrets: he did not come up with any explanation as to "restorationism." His companions from "Marcelismo" in a general way are "restorationists."

Personality Seen Not Fitting

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 28 May 84 p 6

[Article by Pedro Santana Lopes: "Proof of Reason"]

[Text] The Mota Amaral interview which was televised this week is quite informative on various topics.

First of all it clearly revealed the personality of the Azorean politician who was pictured as being interested in the presidential race.

A cautious and introverted man, he is the very model of the human being who detests confrontation and conflict.

In generally concealing the depths of his thinking and his feelings, he above all displayed normalcy and stability.

For this very reason he is a politician with a discourse full of commonplace statements which however are sometimes mixed in with a relatively natural and simple approach which to a certain degree springs from the rather naive nature of his character.

He is a man who, by virtue of his education, appears to believe in the natural goodness of men or at least in their ability to change, something which makes him advance political proposals that boil down to the idea of everybody cooperating with everybody else.

He has a rather idyllic vision, a vision which entails sufficient dangers because men are not angels and the earth is not a paradise.

In some way we should be rather astonished that Mota Amaral entertains this blind belief because we know about several of his attitudes before and after 25 April, where he showed that he had a perfect concept of the "mischievousness" (to put it mildly) inherent in politics.

Here is one aspect: either Mota Amaral does not grasp the meaning of the proposals he is making (which is a dangerous thing to do) or he knows only too well what they involve (and then the danger is even more serious).

But in addition to what we have said so far, the interview also shows in an exemplary way one of the two political operating styles that continue to confront each other in Portugal: there is the style of Mota Amaral and that was also the style of the "questions that cannot be put aside," consisting of a marked drive to hold on to government power, a permanent accommodation, a constant dissimulation; the other one is symbolized by a group that always exists in the PSD and that today expresses its sensitivities and can be characterized by acute nonconformism by an enormous longing for change, and by an open desire for a frontal clash.

We must also mention here another motive which persuaded us to consider the above-mentioned program as being quite illustrative.

He tackled a question put to him by the woman interviewer, concerning the religious options of Mota Amaral.

To some people in Portugal, a question of that kind could still appear to be shocking because it would be considered an invasion of privacy.

The only thing is that, in all democracies, politicians know that they do not have the right to conceal their opinions, regardless of what they may be. If an ordinary citizen wants to retain his privacy, then let him not accept public office.

At any rate, Mota Pinto displayed a minimum of coherence with himself, precisely as regards the extent to which he supported the current government formula and he was cautious in talking about the president of the republic. The country thus learned that Mota Amaral is not a man who like "Mota" is only interested in timid suggestions; one might say that the only change on which he placed special and original emphasis was the change regarding mentality. Not that we are entirely in accord, specifically as regards the interview.

We believe that the last PSD Congress was right in rejecting the candidacy of Joao Bosco Mota Amaral to the office of president.

SIFO POLL SHOWS CONTINUED GAINS FOR SDP, VPK

Nonsocialist Decline Continuing

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 27 May 84 p 6

[Article by Hans O. Alfredsson]

[Text] The Social Democrats and the Communist Left Party are increasing their advantage over the nonsocialist parties. The Conservative Party is declining for the fifth month in a row. Three of the five parties represented in Parliament are at the same level as in April.

This appears from the poll taken by SVENSKA DAGBLADET/Sifo [Sifo: The Swedish Institute of Public Opinion Research] for May, with the following percentage figures for the various parties:

The Conservative Party 26.5 percent (-0.5 percent), the Liberal Party 8.0 percent (unchanged), the Center Party 13.0 percent (-0.5 percent), the Social Democrats 43.5 percent (unchanged), the Communist Left Party 5.5 percent (unchanged). Other parties 3.5 percent (- 1.0 percent).

The Social Democrats and the Communist Left Party thus get a total of 49.0 percent as against 47.5 percent for the three nonsocialist parties.

During the period 2-22 May, 976 persons answered the standard question asked by SVENSKA DAGBLADET/Sifo: "Which party do you like best today?"

They Know What They Want

The immediate conclusion is: The Swedish voters now know what they want, and they adhere to their parties. During the past 3 months, the shifts among the parties have been very small. The number of uncertain voters has now also dropped further--from 4.5 percent in April to 3.5 percent in May (last February 8.0 percent).

The situation among the electorate is, in other words, stable.

This also appears from the long-term trend. With a single exception (an advance for the Center Party by 0.1 percent), all parties have the same trend level as in April.

Close to Long-Term Levels

In the poll for May, all parties are also very close to their long-term levels. An exception is the Conservative Party, which lies 1.4 percent below the trend level (37.0 percent). The three nonsocialist parties lie below their trend levels, the Social Democrats and the Communist Left Party lie above.

All changes from April to May remain within the margin of error.

The Social Democrats and the Communist Left Party are now larger than the nonsocialist parties for the third month in a row. In March, when a trend which had lasted for 7 months was broken, and in April, the difference was minute, viz. .2 percentage unit. It has now increased to 1.5.

The nonsocialist parties have lost 1 percentage unit since April. From a purely statistical point of view, this is due to the fact that the small parties (the Christian Democratic Party, the Environmental Party, etc.) have increased their support by the same figure. Both the Social Democrats and the Communist Left Party show the same results as in April.

Within the Liberal Party, the poll probably has the same effect as a tranquilizer. The most recent poll taken by the Institute for Market Research, according to which the party dropped by .5 percentage units to 7.5 percent, gave rise to marked nervousness. The poll taken by SVENSKA DAGBLADET/Sifo confirms, if anything, that the Liberal Party has found a steady level, which is twice as high as it was 10 months ago.

The Conservative Party has declined every month since last December, when the party had a support of 40 percent according to the poll taken by SVENSKA DAGBLADET/Sifo. The Conservative Party has not been at a lower level than now since 1950. However, compared to the election result in 1950, the level is high (at the time, the Conservative Party obtained 71.5 percent of the vote).

As far as the Communist Left Party is concerned, the poll confirms that the gain in April by 1 percentage unit was not accidental. The Social Democrats are at a level which (apart from 0.5 percent in March) is the highest level since June of last year. Also in the case of the Center Party, the situation is stable.

Conservative Newspaper Views Poll

Stockholm (Vilka) is close to Swedish May 1951

Text. Today's Sifo report does not contain any significant changes compared to the April poll. The situation is marked by stability within the electorate and a relative balance between the blocs. The socialist bloc, however, has a small expansion.

The poll, however, shows somewhat more than this. It is clear that the Conservative Party is the one that has not lost sight of its position. Its support

slow decline, though at a slow pace, in several polls in a row. This trend, however, started at a record-high level, the highest level measured for a non-socialist party since polls of this kind were first taken.

Most notably, the Conservative Party, moreover, has been subject to very severe and largely irresponsible attacks, particularly in the security policy area.

To fully understand the situation, one should also take into consideration the fact that the strong position of the Conservative party, to a certain extent, may have been due to a manifestation of protest in the opinion polls from voters who normally vote for the middle parties but who find that they can expect to depart from their old parties in opinion polls. It is natural that this tendency should decline as the distance in time increased to the next government, which has been little appreciated in nonsocialist circles.

The current Sifo poll, moreover, shows that the rumor of the impending decline of the Liberal Party was considerably exaggerated. On the contrary, the report shows stability. Three weeks ago, panic broke out when the Institute for Market Research noted a substantial drop in the support of the Liberal Party. Party leader Carlsson was declared man of the week by certain people who claimed to understand the situation and who, in their hearts, of course, still at the core of the Liberal Party in the market + Liberal direction which has come to be associated with the most recent change in party leadership. In addition, the desire for nonsocialist cooperation was claimed to constitute a great danger for the Liberal Party.

Seeing that all of this talk was based on an accidental deviation in one single opinion poll, there is reason to hope that the Liberal Party will now avoid any panic measures.

According to the opinion polls, things are going well for the government. The economic situation is such that the economic policy pursued by the government appears to be successful. This, however, is only one aspect. On the whole, a policy is pursued which, due to its lack of vigorous efforts to solve the structural problems within the economy, will make the situation even worse once a trade recession begins to set in.

Sweden is in the midst of an economic crisis, the daily manifestations of which are partly concealed by the business boom. This is the best possible occasion to correct the basic errors within the economy: the budget deficit, the major problem of the public sector, wage rates which are not at all adjusted to the market, etc. However, this opportunity is being lost.

END: /

FOLKETING MUST ADDRESS PROPOSAL FOR WEU MILITARY STRUCTURE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 May 84 p 11

[Commentary by 'Monitor': "What Now, Little Country?"]

[Text] Despite the violent security-policy debate of recent years in Denmark, very little attention has been paid to the tendencies in West Europe which before long could confront Denmark with difficult choices.

On 15 March this year the Folketing had a security-policy. On the same date there was a foreign policy debate in the Storting in Oslo. What was discussed in the two parliaments that day? Yes, in Denmark they discussed once again the idea of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic countries. On the other hand the main point in the Norwegian foreign policy debate was the relations between the United States and West Europe and the European dimension of the NATO countries' security-policy and defense cooperation, including the European Political Cooperation (EPS) and the idea of a revival of the West European Union (WEU).

Where the Folketing for the 117th but far from the last time pursued a mirage, the Storting had an interesting debate about what is actually happening in West European security policy and the problems it raises for Norway, and the choices these developments put before the country. These questions are no less important for Denmark. But they have apparently have not yet been able to find room for them on the Folketing agenda.

An important part of the background of the actual European debate is relations between West Europe and America. In recent years the competitive economic interests as well as the different basic security-policy conditions have become clearly marked. Differences of opinion in the security-policy area are over central questions, such as how the countries of the West should conduct themselves toward the Soviet Union, under what conditions a dialogue can be held with Moscow and a relaxation of tensions can be resumed.

Even though there are differences between the ideas of the individual West European countries on these and other important questions, they have developed the contours of a unified position. The debate in several West Euro-

tain countries concerns how this European dimension of security policy can best be strengthened.

A significant framework for the debate on this question has for 10 years been European Political Cooperation (EPS). Its first and also greatest success has been the combined appearance at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Since then the 10 countries in the London report of 1981 have declared themselves ready to discuss questions of importance to "the political aspects of security." And then the European Council, at its meeting in Stuttgart in June 1983--inspired by the Genscher/Columbo initiative which was so denounced in Denmark--approved a so-called "Formal Declaration of European Union." Herein there is mention of "coordinating the attitudes of the member states to the political and economic aspects of security." But that was one of the six points which Denmark took exception to.

EPS is the natural forum where the 10 countries can discuss common security-policy problems. Ireland's neutrality naturally places certain limits on how far one can go, but so far it has largely been differences in attitude between the participants which have limited cooperative possibilities concerning security policy.

Here, as in other areas in cooperation between the EC countries, the members' different ideas of how far they can and should go have led to recommendations about a "Europe going at two speeds," meaning to go farther in cooperation between the countries which are willing, and not wait for the slowest ship in the convoy.

An example of how some countries have chosen to go farther in security-policy cooperation can be seen in the relations between France and West Germany. At the summit meeting of the two countries in Paris in 1982 they agreed to an "amplified exchange of views on security-policy questions." and immediately before their next summit in Bonn the same fall, the countries' foreign and defense ministers met for discussions.

Three combined working groups have now been established on the civil service level in which there are continuous discussions of political-strategic questions, military cooperation and combined weapons production.

Lately from the French side it has been recommended that the West European Union (WEU) be revived. WEU, which consists of France, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries, was set up in 1955 as the framework for West Germany's rearmament and acceptance into NATO. Its role has been very limited, but it exists today as a possible forum for closer security-policy cooperation between the West European countries.

Activation of WEU would give France, which is a member of the Atlantic Alliance but not of the military cooperation in NATO, a possibility of

playing a central role in the shaping of West European viewpoints within the alliance. At the same time the WEU is without the supranational pull of the EC--and without neutral Ireland and the troublesome flank countries, Denmark and Greece.

Great Britain's interest in the revival of the WEU is limited, but the prospect of a two-sided French-West German cooperation can be expected to get Great Britain in spite of that to support closer cooperation within the WEU in order to get influence on security-policy developments in Western Europe.

For West Germany it is not a matter of replacing the United States with France as the decisive guarantor power; but West Germany has an understandable interest in the development of French strategic thinking (especially the role of the new tactical nuclear weapons) and military planning (concerning the new emergency deployment force). Finally there will be significant economic gains to be made through increased joint weapons production.

Both the two-sided cooperation and an eventual revival of WEU will mean a closer integration of France in Western defense cooperation. That is in West Germany's interest. By using WEU West Germany can create a hope that the historically determined borders, which are for the defense of the country (apart from the limitations of the nuclear weapons area) will be abolished.

The new tones in French security policy have been the cause of much speculation. When the country--even under a socialist president--moved closer to NATO, desires a close security-political cooperation with West Germany and has become a wholehearted defender of the double resolution, which the country itself does not participate in, there must be more explanations. One is perhaps an understandable but also exaggerated fear that West Germany will move in the direction of neutrality. Another explanation, which does not conflict with the first, can be that only by being a reliable security-political partner of West Germany (and the other EC countries) can France have any hope of playing a leading role in West Europe and gradually develop a closer military cooperation with the West European countries.

There is clearly a development underway which points to closer security-policy cooperation in West Europe, even if its concrete form and content is still unclear. This development will raise problems for Denmark, and give the country difficult choices. Will we merely look passively on, risk isolation and thereby increase difficulties for safeguarding Danish interests?

As these questions have not so far been the objects of debate in Denmark, this can be due to a lack of political attention, and also fear that if

debate will merely get parts of the leftwing and the People's Movement Against the EC to again evoke the ghost called "the EC Army," and thereby rapidly confuse the issue.

Also the approaching election to the European Parliament, which the People's Movement is trying to turn into a new "referendum" for and against EC membership, can be expected to have a restraining effect on serious debate. But even that be right, that the People's Movement with its sterile and irrelevant measure, will also decide the contents of the security-policy debate?

9287

CSO: 0613/171

BRIEFS

AEGEAN AIR MANEUVERS--Large Air Force maneuvers under the code name "Glymbios Dias 84" took place in the Aegean and in Western Thraki from 30 May to 4 June, it was announced yesterday. A basic characteristic of the maneuvers, in which the entire Air Force took part, was the intensive utilization of all forces. The total number of flights rose to 2,500, of which 2,200 were made by fighter aircraft, mainly from jet airports /as published/. It was also announced that in spite of the intensive pace of the operations, the "availability" of the aircraft remained constantly at a very high level, and very few sorties had to be canceled. A number of reservists who had been called for a five-day period participated in the maneuvers, which achieved their objective and demonstrated the general staffs' ability to plan and monitor operations. They also provided clear proof of the high degree of cooperation between the Air Force, the Army and the Navy. [Text] [Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 6 Jun 84 p 1]

CSO: 3521/269

1. The following information was obtained from a confidential source:

2. The source is reliable and the information is accurate.

3. The information was obtained from a confidential source.

4. It was learned that the German chemical industry, which had been hit hard by the war, is now showing signs of recovery. The industry's output is expected to reach 80% of 1939 levels by the end of the year. The industry's profits are also expected to rise. The industry's output is expected to reach 80% of 1939 levels by the end of the year. The industry's profits are also expected to rise. The industry's output is expected to reach 80% of 1939 levels by the end of the year. The industry's profits are also expected to rise.

5. The balance sheets of the German chemical industry for the year 1944 show a significant improvement over the year 1943. The industry's assets are expected to increase by 10% to 15 percent. The industry's liabilities are expected to decrease by 5% to 10 percent. The industry's net worth is expected to increase by 15% to 20 percent. The industry's profits are also expected to rise. The industry's output is expected to reach 80% of 1939 levels by the end of the year. The industry's profits are also expected to rise.

6. It was also learned that the German chemical industry is expected to continue its recovery in the year 1945. The industry's output is expected to reach 90% of 1939 levels by the end of the year. The industry's profits are also expected to rise. The industry's output is expected to reach 90% of 1939 levels by the end of the year. The industry's profits are also expected to rise.

of DM 5.1 billion as against a trade deficit the year before. This return to the plus side was due not only to the start of recovery in the United States but at least equally to the rise of the American Dollar which had not been expected by most currency experts.

The healthy state of the American economy and the strong dollar had a double impact on the profits of German exporters. BMW, for example, increased deliveries to the United States, its biggest overseas market, by 15 percent to 60,000 cars and Daimler Benz increased theirs by almost 10 percent to a total of 73,692 automobiles. A good 50 percent of these were high-priced S-class limousines, large-size coupes and SL sports cars. This year, too, Mercedes is doing well on the American market; the new 190 model compacts helped U.S. sales climb another 28 percent during the first quarter of 1984. The East Coast price for a 190 E is \$23,000 which comes to more than DM 63,000 at an exchange rate of DM 2.70 to the dollar. It is substantially higher than the price of a comparable model on the German market. Even though the export model is not comparable in all respects to the basic model because of the addition of catalyzers, a different type of engine and a number of extras included in the purchase price, competitors estimate Daimler's "extra profit" per U.S. model to be close to \$15,000.

Like the car manufacturers, the big chemical concerns also profited from the American recovery and the strong dollar. By expanding its U.S. sales by 13 percent last year, Bayer was selling 21 percent of its total output on this, the largest chemicals market in the world. Just a little bit more of Bayer's output (23 percent) wound up on the domestic market. Making use of their largely automated production processes, supervised by central control stations, the large chemical companies profited most and fastest from the recovery. A large part of the profits explosion in this sector of the economy is actually due to the fact that production capacity in the industry climbed from 70 to over 80 percent in the space of a single year.

The chemical industry succeeded in making big profits and paying higher dividends to their investors because it managed to get rid of structural weaknesses faster and more methodically than firms in other sectors of the economy. Under the impact of the second oil crisis 5 years ago, the industry began to reduce unprofitable overproduction in the fibers, plastics and fertilizer sector. By the end of 1981, Bayer had shut down most of its Perlon plant at Dormagen, transferring about 1,000 employees to other plants. The drastic step paid off: Bayer's fiber production (concentrating on Dralon) was back in the black again in 1983. BASF went about cutting its production of its standard plastics line in the same rigorous fashion. Profits climbed 88 percent to DM 517 million. Between 1980 and 1983, BASF cut PVC output by 11 percent; polystyrol facilities by 21 percent and polyethylene production by 49 percent and Hoechst decided on a gradual shutdown of its fertilizer production at the parent plant.

[illegible]

Aufschwung in der Kasse (1)

Gewinne deutscher Aktiengesellschaften nach Steuern
(Jahresüberschuß) – in Mill. Mark

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Daimler Benz	638	711	826	921	950 ¹⁾
Bayer	436	730	517	64	754
Deutsche Bank	427	457	412	343	654
	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83
Gutehoffnungshütte Aktienverein (GHH)	121	121,4	116,6	64,3	-83,9
Siemens	682	633	509	738	802

Addierte Jahresüberschüsse von rund 750 deutschen Industrie-Aktiengesellschaften²⁾ – in Mrd. Mark

1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
8.2676	7.245	6.378	6.804	- ^{a)}

6.7:

- The 1970-71 fiscal year saw a record 100 million (100 million) — 100 million of...
- The 1971-72 fiscal year saw a record 100 million (100 million) — 100 million of...

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KETENCI PRESSES CRUSADE FOR UNION REPRESENTATION

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 10 May 84 p 9

[Article by Sukran Ketenci in column "Labor World": "More of the Same"]

[Text] The climate, it is true, has changed; when we get away from the "social state" for an economic model, when "economy first" replaces "people first," when, in our opinion, the whole concept has been bungled. The public is hardly even interested in labor-management relations and problems, in union problems, anymore.

I imagine there are some of us who remember the years since 1963 when we first embarked upon unionized, collective bargaining. There used to be newspapers that put effort into broad coverage of labor-union problems, not just generally but at individual workplaces.

Some time later, after a transition period of 3.5 years, we entered upon a new collective bargaining system under new laws. In addition, there is a much larger mass of workers, or unionized working public, concerned with these problems. Yet the newspapers are as disinterested as can be. The unions are becalmed. The political parties and politicians are insensitive to problems which have been growing to giant-size. By law, collective bargaining was supposed to have begun in January, you know. It is May. No more than a few workplaces have yet received enabling documentation from the ministry to allow the call for collective bargaining to be made. The response received from, if you please, lower echelon ministry officials to timid criticisms is: "It is not true that shop authorizations are being delayed. We will issue them as soon as possible." First, there was a 1.5-month delay in general statistics. Then, where the law speaks of 6 days at most, there have been months of delay without explanation for authorizing documents. There has been a steadily growing number of expiring contracts starting in November and December of last year and since January.

The contract summons can be made and negotiations begun only after receiving the authorizing documents, and discussions and disagreements will take many more months. And months, perhaps years, will be added to the months workers have been without contracts already. Can one survive, working under these economic conditions for wages which are ridiculous compared to daily rising prices? The public doesn't seem to care.

There are some negative developments in the interest in, approach to, and taking responsibility for labor problems. But where problems of choosing shop unions and how numerous, the political administration to the unions are concerned, it is all just "bureaucratic formalism." Yet no new basic union rights were restricted in the course of reaching shop union problems and preventing a negative approach to the unions by political administration.

Thanks to the restrictions on fundamental rights in the laws, the number of unions was reduced with the strike system from 140 to 100 in order to enforce it. This, not by the worker's free will or the informed choice of a strong union. A big law, which had been brought into the system for designating shop unions. Still it takes months to do it. It is as though falsifications have increased rather than declined. It is as if the Ministry, which has assumed many broader responsibilities under the new law, had put a greater premium on falsifications. The TÜRK-İS (Turkish Confederation of Labor) front accuses the ministry of designating unions which are not its members as shop unions, while the Turkish Moral Rights Workers Trade Union front accuses TÜRK-İS of conspiracy to hinder their becoming shop unions.

We cannot help but recall the debates of the law; the referendum, which workers could more easily have endorsed and secured the most practical solution, but which ignored some of the union leaders and was something the employers did not even want to discuss. The law has even been said to be illegal. In seeking another method of solution other than the referendum, which it was said the lawmakers would never endorse, scientific circles proposed bringing in the computer as the method of securing final results. At that time also, both in newspaper columns and at scientific meetings where all sides were debated to offer guidance to lawmakers, we expressed our concern over the political administration's making the choices, considering its competence and the other choices which notaries might introduce if this means were used. If one chooses to feed in fraudulent or false information, how can the computer give accurate results?

When the legal restriction of rights is attempted as a means to prevent union proliferation, abuses such as restricting the way and union discrimination are naturally bound to increase. On one hand, some unions which workers elect in their shops are not designated, even if they have a majority, on the rationale that "they are not qualified in 10 percent of their branch of labor, they have not got the 10 percent minimum." On the other hand, unions for which there has never been a question of getting the minimum are designated on the basis of membership rolls which are false or legally invalid. In order to take advantage of the right of collective bargaining, workers are forced to join such unions which have been falsified. In the beginning, the political administration and management and have never, in fact, been able to stand up for workers' rights. What is the legal or fair rationale for that?

Everybody knows that the data fed into the computer does not reflect accurately either the number of workers or their union membership. Obviously, shop union authorization cannot be issued on the basis of the data fed into the computer, which operates on a statistical base. (The number of workers which unions report as members for one shop exceeds the total shop employment because the same persons are listed as members of more than one union. Double membership is prohibited by law. Which membership is to be counted as valid, which false? If memberships are

deleted as violations of the law, no one can be issued the shop document, the shop will have no contract and the worker will have no union. It's all a knotty mess.)

Will we persist knowingly and with our eyes open in errors and injustices which will only open deep wounds in the future of labor-management relations? Is there anything one could say on behalf of getting out from under a set of statistics that is wrong from start to finish which would justify or excuse the waste of all this time, the delay in issuing shop authorizations and condemning many unions to deprivation of rights? Parliament amended the law on the desired subjects in a matter of hours; could not the government, which "finishes the work" of parliament, unravel the snarl in the authorization problem if it wanted to? How easy it would be to rescind the required minimum law, which has no place in union principles, and find better, more practical solutions for the designation of shop unions, not excluding the referendum. Provided it was desired. But if it is desired that the political administration and the employers keep the fate of the unions in their own hands behind the screen of shop union problems, then "more of the same" will, of course, be the choice.

8349

CSO: 3554/228

ULAGAY ON ILL-CONCEIVED OZAL POLICY CHOICES

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 30 May 84 p 9

[Editorial by Osman Ulagay: "Ozal's Difficult Choice"]

[Text] It looks as if Ozal and his associates are beginning to see more and more the risks and drawbacks involved in trying to finish the job in the economy with the idea of "having done what was promised" while disregarding the criticism coming from both inside and outside Parliament. Furthermore, they have probably come to understand far better in recent weeks the dangers in trying to measure the success of the economy by two indices like inflation and exports, which do not tell the whole story.

It seems imperative to establish a few things at this point:

- The economic policies Ozal has been implementing from the time he was elected until now are a natural, consistent extension of the policies in effect since 24 January 1980. Supporting the post-1980 implementations and then suddenly coming out in opposition to recent implementations has no economic logic.
- If the assertion that Ozal's policies have dragged the economy to a standstill today is true, this is largely because four years of implementation have exhausted some of the reserves or standby resources of the economy and society. New constraints made in the economy without structural reforms in the fullest sense are likely to bring harm rather than good.
- While the masses want to see four years of sacrificing end now, the business world worries about decisions that are changing "overnight" in the name of a "free market economy." It is not easy for an industrialist to relax and make investments when he cannot see the future within at least a five-year perspective and has no way of knowing how he will be protected or unprotected.
- The interest which the matter of "invisible exports" has received shows that there is a public opinion potential against

the export princes and the "forget it and let them do it" philosophy. The fact that the names of certain firms have leaked into the press, however, has reinforced allegations that some firms are being given preferential treatment and has created unrest in the private sector.

-- Perhaps from the standpoint of achieving quick results, there may be some value to finishing the job with the idea that "there was no alternative; we did what we promised to do," and disregarding the warnings and criticism coming from both inside and outside Parliament. However, any government taking this route needs to take a good account of Turkey-1984.

-- The events of recent weeks give one the impression that this account may not have been well taken. The Ozal administration cannot achieve the results it was hoping to achieve at this time on the inflation front. While it is being criticized for this, the shadow of "invisible exports" has been cast upon exports--the very thing that Ozal was pointing to as his greatest success. Reactions by the sector displeased with the Ozal economy are gaining a quality, a political dimension, that is going to hurt Ozal through the two points he was depending upon the most.

Actually, just as the fact that some exports are "invisible" or that inflation (which accelerated in 1983) is still running at an annual rate of about 50 percent does not constitute sufficient proof that Ozal's economy is a failure, so too, if "invisible exports" are forgotten by the end of the year and inflation is running about 25 percent, this is not going to suffice to prove that the Ozal economy is a success. The Ozal economy's real problems will only begin after exports are raised to 8 billion dollars and inflation is reduced to 25 percent. More important than all of this, however, are the claims and indicators that the stability program in effect for four years has been pushing the endurance of the masses to the limit.

Given these conditions, it is going to be more and more difficult to implement economic measures based on the sacrifices of citizens, without gaining broad-based public support. To insist upon such measures could lead to more extensive and organized reactions. Moreover, for a small team to insist on measures that have been seen to be inadequate by considering its own way to be the "only correct" way will only intensify opposition to the government's economic policy.

Under the circumstances, the Ozal administration has three options: It can (1) persist with this policy without paying any attention to the source, intensity or degree of reactions; (2) change the implementation methods, if not the heart, of the economic policy by seeking broader understanding both inside

and outside Parliament; (3) search for a new economic policy.

Our guess is that Ozal will choose the first option, never stopping to think that he is not Reagan or Thatcher, and never paying any attention to the difference between the political conditions in Turkey and those in the U.S. and Great Britain. ...And we are worried about the future of both the economy and democracy.

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